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The Continued Impact of Carcieri on
the Restoration of Tribal Homelands:
In New England and Beyond
Bethany Sullivan and Jennifer Turner*
INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the United States Supreme Court decided Carcieri v.
Salazar,1 a case involving the Department of the Interior’s (the Department or Interior) authority under section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)2 to acquire land into trust for the Narragansett Indian Tribe. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, Interior
had long interpreted the IRA as providing statutory authority to
acquire land in trust for all federally recognized tribes. Following
Carcieri, Interior must now determine whether an applicant tribe
was “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934 in order to satisfy the IRA’s
* Bethany Sullivan is a Senior Associate Attorney with Maier Pfeffer
Kim Geary & Cohen LLP. Jennifer Turner is the Deputy Director, City of Albuquerque, Department of Municipal Development. Both authors formerly
served as attorneys with the Division of Indian Affairs, Office of the Solicitor,
Department of the Interior, where they advised on numerous fee-to-trust determinations and cases. The views in this Article are the authors’ own and do
not reflect the views of the Department of the Interior or their current employers.
1. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
2. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 984, 985 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5108) (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his
discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within
or without existing reservations, . . . for the purpose of providing land for Indians . . . Title to any lands or rights acquired . . . shall be taken in the name
of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which
the land is acquired.”).
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first definition of “Indian”3 and invoke section 5. Alternatively, the
Department may find that a tribe satisfies another definition of “Indian” in the IRA or that there exists separate statutory authority
authorizing the fee-to-trust decision, such as a later Congressional
act extending the IRA to a specific tribe.
Carcieri has had a cascade of devastating effects across Indian
country, as section 5 of the IRA is the primary mechanism by which
tribes restore their ancestral lands. Tribes, Interior, and federal
courts have grappled with the nebulous idea of what it means for a
tribe to have been “under federal jurisdiction” in 1934, consuming
limited tribal and Interior resources and upending an already burdensome trust acquisition process. Congress has repeatedly tried,
and failed, to fix the issue legislatively by removing the problematic
language from the statute. Larger concerns and misperceptions
about the fee-to-trust process by state and local governments, other
fee-to-trust opponents, and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle
have torpedoed these Congressional efforts.
The authors here have already explored the first ten years following the Carcieri decision in depth in our article Enough is
Enough: Ten Years of Carcieri v. Salazar.4 For a reader who is unfamiliar with the Carcieri decision and its implications, we urge you
to first read that piece. This Article is intended as a complement,
identifying developments from the last several years during the
change of presidential administrations. We also explore with particularity the situation of New England tribes who, due to their
unique (and unlawful) subjugation to state authority, face a more
difficult time showing the historical existence of federal jurisdiction. We conclude, yet again, that the best path forward is a legislative fix. As an alternative, we also support a regulatory proposal
intended to formalize the Department’s current approach to Carcieri and protect past and future fee-to-trust acquisitions made on
behalf of tribal nations.

3. § 19 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 5129) (“The term ‘Indian’ . . . shall include
all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe
now under [f]ederal jurisdiction.”).
4. Bethany C. Sullivan & Jennifer L. Turner, Enough is Enough: Ten
Years of Carcieri v. Salazar, 40 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 37 (2019).
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I.

RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

As detailed below, the Trump and Biden administrations have
taken vastly different positions on fee-to-trust, generally, and in regards to Carcieri specifically. President Trump withdrew several
pro-tribal Obama era Solicitor’s Opinions, including on Carcieri,
and revisited several Carcieri opinions for particular tribes from the
Obama administration. In contrast, President Biden has prioritized restoration of tribal homelands and reinstated Solicitor’s
Opinions from the Obama administration. This whiplash has complicated the already cumbersome fee-to-trust process, as detailed
below.
A. The Trump Administration
From the outset of the Trump administration, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke made it abundantly clear that he viewed the restoration of tribal lands differently than his predecessor when he
called for an off-ramp to trust lands so that tribes could become a
corporation.5 By the end of the Trump administration, the fee-totrust process was in limbo, at best, or shambles, at worst. Trump
decisionmakers imposed a new Carcieri framework that resulted in
confusion regarding the process, settled Carcieri decisions being revisited unnecessarily, and off-reservation trust acquisitions languishing before the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs.6
1.

M-37055 & the Four-Step Solicitor Procedures

As explored at length in our original article, the Obama administration, through M-37029, established a two-part framework for
determining whether a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934
(referred to throughout this Article as either M-37029 or the twopart framework).7 M-37029 further opined that a tribe need not be
5. Secretary Zinke Advocates ‘Off Ramp’ for Taking Lands out of Trust,
INDIANZ (May 3, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/news/2017/05/03/secretaryzinke-advocates-offramp-for-ta.asp [https://perma.cc/4TYL-N7SS].
6. See Trump Administration Erects New Hurdle for Off-Reservation Casinos, INDIANZ (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.indianz.com/IndianGaming/2017/04/13/trump-administration-erects-new-hurdle-f.asp
[https://perma.cc/KF4V-2AEP].
7. Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solic., Dep’t of the Interior, to
Sally Jewell, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior (Mar. 12, 2014),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/uploads/M-37029.pdf
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recognized in 1934, but rather, need only be recognized at the time
of its application.8 Every court to evaluate the two-part framework
or a Departmental determination that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 has upheld it.9
Despite the overwhelming success of the prior Administration’s
approach to Carcieri, in March 2020, the Department, acting
through its Office of the Solicitor, re-evaluated its interpretation of
the Carcieri decision and the IRA, ultimately withdrawing M37029.10 In contrast to the clear position taken in M-37029, the
Department found a tribe must have been both recognized and under federal jurisdiction as of 1934. Specifically, the Department
concluded “we interpret the entire phrase ‘recognized Indian tribe
now under federal jurisdiction’ to include tribes ‘recognized’ in or
before 1934 who remained under federal authority at the time of
the IRA’s enactment.”11
Nonetheless, the Department specified “we do not take the
view that Department officials must have been cognizant at the
time of the IRA’s enactment that a tribe was ‘recognized’ or ‘under
federal jurisdiction,’” acknowledging the Department may have
taken subsequent action to correct past errors.12 The Department
further explained “[l]ike M-37029, we interpret ‘recognized’ . . . to
mean something different from the modern concept of ‘federally recognized.’”13 The Department concluded this term should be understood in the political-legal, not ethnological, sense.14
[https://perma.cc/83LV-RYEJ] [hereinafter M-37029]; see Sullivan & Turner,
supra note 4, at 77–83.
8. M-37029, supra note 7, at 24–25.
9. Sullivan & Turner, supra note 4, at 73.
10. Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, Solic., Dep’t of the Interior, to
David L. Bernhardt, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior & Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant
Sec’y, Indian Affs. 2 (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/m37055.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q5E-U9NR]; Memorandum from Kyle E. Scherer,
Deputy Solic., Indian Affs., to Daniel H. Jorjani, Solic., Dep’t of the Interior 31
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ots/pdf/
20200812_DEP_SOL_to_SOL_Slip_Pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/NML7-MELY]
[hereinafter Mar. 5, 2020 Deputy Solicitor Memo].
11. Mar. 5, 2020 Deputy Solicitor Memo, supra note 10, at 31.
12. Id. at 31 n.255 (citing Cty. of Amador v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 872
F.3d 1012, 1023–24 (2017); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 397–98 (Breyer, J. concurring)).
13. Id. at 31.
14. Id.
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As a practical complement to its revised legal interpretation,
the Solicitor’s Office issued a four-step procedure (the Solicitor Procedures) for determining tribal eligibility.15 The first three steps
articulated different forms of dispositive or presumptive evidence
satisfying a tribe’s eligibility.16 Step One solely considered whether
Congress enacted legislation after 1934 making the IRA applicable
to a particular tribe.17 Step Two examined whether a tribe was
under federal jurisdiction in 1934, as shown by contemporaneous
evidence that the federal government exercised or administered its
responsibilities over the applicant tribe or its members in 1934.18
Dispositive evidence included: IRA Section 18 elections, IRA Section 16 constitutions, IRA Section 17 corporate charters, continued
existence of ratified treaty rights, inclusion on the Department’s
1934 Indian population report, federal efforts to acquire lands on
behalf of the tribe in the years leading up to 1934, and inclusion in
Volume V of Charles J. Kappler’s Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties.19
Step Three considered whether a tribe’s evidence sufficiently
demonstrates that it was “recognized” in or before 1934 and remained under jurisdiction in 1934.20 Presumptive evidence included: ratified treaties still in effect in 1934; tribe-specific executive orders; and tribe-specific legislation, including termination
legislation enacted after 1934 that acknowledges the existence of a
government-to-government relationship with a tribe at the time of
enactment.21
In the absence of dispositive or presumptive evidence under
Steps One through Three, the Solicitor Procedures required weighing the totality of evidence under Step Four.22 In other words, a
tribe was required to submit evidence sufficiently showing that it
15. See generally Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, Solic., Dep’t of the
Interior, to Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affs. (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ots/pdf/20200812_DEP_SOL_
to_SOL_Slip_Pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA4Y-GAXL] [hereinafter Solicitor
Procedures].
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2–6.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id.
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was “recognized” in or before 1934 and remained “under federal jurisdiction” through 1934. The inquiry was fact specific, without the
same dispositive or presumptive categories of evidence outlined in
Steps One through Three. Although Step Four lacked a list of relevant evidence, it did reference the evidence considered in the Part
83 acknowledgment process,23 such as treaty relations, denomination as a tribe in a Congressional act or executive order, treatment
by the federal government as having collective rights in lands or
funds, and the existence of lands held for the tribe or its ancestors
by the United States.24
There are obvious similarities between the Carcieri analysis
required under the Trump-era Solicitor Procedures and that required under the M-37029 framework. For example, many of the
same types of evidence are considered relevant and certain types of
evidence, such as the holding of IRA Section 18 or Section 16 elections, were dispositive under both approaches. Yet, as mentioned
above, one of the primary distinctions is the Solicitor Procedures’
requirement that a tribe must have been federally recognized—as
well as under federal jurisdiction—in 1934 to qualify under Carcieri. That said, it is not at all clear from the Procedures what types
of evidence demonstrate recognition versus federal jurisdiction, and
the inquiries seemed to be conflated in practice. The Solicitor Procedures also appeared to diminish the value of evidence that the
United States provided services to individual tribal members. For
example, the Procedures rejected the significance of BIA school records for Indian children unless the schooling was clearly provided
for the benefit of their tribe, as well as the federal census records
unless specifically generated by the Office of Indian Affairs pursuant to the Appropriations Act of 1884.25 Moreover, as detailed below, tribes who spent years trying to demonstrate their “under federal jurisdiction” status through the original two-part framework

23. Tribes may be formally acknowledged through 25 C.F.R. Part 83. The
regulations require tribes to make certain showings through the submission of
detailed evidence in support. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.12(a).
24. Solicitor Procedures, supra note 15, at 9.
25. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Zinke, 466 F. Supp. 3d 199, 219 (D.D.C.
2020) (finding that the Department’s negative determination for the Mashpee
tribe, while issued under the M-37029 standard, “reflect[ed] some of the new
standards” in the Department’s Solicitor Procedures, such as the treatment of
BIA school records and census records).
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were forced to start over with a new test and a new showing of
recognition.
Interior’s new Carcieri analysis was viewed with skepticism
and alarm by one federal district court judge, who concluded “I don’t
know how anyone could take that as guidance because it’s incomprehensible and so convoluted that it couldn’t guide any lawyer in
the field.”26 Moreover, the shift to the Solicitor Procedures created
confusion and frustration across Indian Country regarding the Carcieri process and the practical effect of the new framework.27 Many
wondered why the shift had occurred at all, given that there was no
identified need to alter the two-part framework under M-37029,
which had been afforded consistent deference by the federal
courts.28 Tribal leaders were further frustrated with the complete
lack of government-to-government consultation between the Department and tribal nations before the Department unexpectedly
changed its approach to Carcieri.29 Ultimately, the new Procedures
only served to muddle an already frustrating fee-to-trust process,
and forced tribes to spend scant resources on trying to understand
and satisfy the new requirements.
2.

Decisions Issued Pursuant to the Solicitor Procedures

Although the new Carcieri interpretation and accompanying
Solicitor Procedures brought much consternation, this framework
was only in place for a year until the Biden Administration reverted
to the M-37029 approach. While we do not examine every
26. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 51, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v.
Zinke, 466 F. Supp. 3d 199 (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:18-cv-02242), ECF No. 71.
27. See, e.g., Andrew Westney, Tribes Unsure Where They’ll Land with
New DOI Trust Policy, LAW360 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www-law360com.rwulaw.idm.oclc.org/articles/1256398/tribes-unsure-where-they-ll-landwith-new-doi-trust-policy [https://perma.cc/5ZDH-59LT].
28. Id.; see also Confederated Tribes of Grant Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 830
F.3d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (applying Chevron deference to the Department’s
two-part framework and its application to the Cowlitz tribe); Cnty. of Amador
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 872 F.3d 1012, 1031 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding the
Department’s two-part framework and its application to the Ione Band of
Miwok Indians), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 64 (2018).
29. Acee Agoyo, Trump Administration Changes Course with Withdrawal
of Pro-Tribal Homelands Policy, INDIANZ (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.indianz.com/News/2020/03/10/trump-administration-charges-course-with.asp
[https://perma.cc/NY5P-TDE2].
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determination issued pursuant to the Solicitor Procedures, we highlight some of the more notable determinations below.30
a.

Catawba Indian Nation

Interior issued a Carcieri determination for the Catawba Indian Nation contemporaneously with the new Solicitor Procedures,
ostensibly with the intent of illustrating the Department’s new approach to Carcieri. The Catawba Nation has a long history of dealing directly with the State of South Carolina, although there had
been periods of federal involvement, including meeting with first
U.S. President, George Washington, and receiving federal appropriations from Congress to relocate the Nation into the Indian territory west of the Mississippi (this move was never effectuated).31
Over time, the Nation lost vast swaths of its aboriginal and reservation lands and beginning in the late nineteenth century it sought
federal assistance in bringing Nonintercourse Act land claims
against the State of South Carolina.32 These requests were denied,
in part because the Commissioner of Indian Affairs erroneously
viewed the Catawba as “state” Indians who were never recognized
by the federal government.33

30. The Trump-era Interior did create a much-needed centralized website
where all its new Carcieri determinations were posted, which helped applicant
tribes understand the new approach and developing precedent. See Solicitor’s
Eligibility Determinations, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS., https://web.archive.org/web/20210804150814/ https://www.bia.gov/bia/ots/fee-to-trust/solicitors-eligibility-determinations [https://perma.cc/VPN5-TT6Z] (last visited May
15, 2022). Although the new administration has re-instated M-37029, this
webpage is still available. The new administration has apparently not continued the practice of posting its Carcieri determinations, as the website has not
been updated since December 2020. We strongly urge them to do so, as well
as prior determinations issued during the Obama administration. Not only
does posting prior determinations provide a valuable resource for tribes submitting their own Carcieri documentation, but it also demonstrates the significant resources it takes to prepare such determinations.
31. Memorandum from Robert S. Hitchcock, Att’y-Advisor, Branch of Env’t
& Lands, Div. of Indian Affs., to Bruce Maytubby, Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian
Affs. E. Region 2–4 (Mar. 10, 2020).
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 4–5 (citing a letter from F.E. Leupp, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, dated January 23, 1906); see also id. at 5 (detailing a 1911 Commissioner’s Annual Report that described the Catawba as having been “‘more or
less’ independent of federal supervision, with South Carolina having ‘assumed
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Confusion over the Nation’s jurisdictional status spurred the
colloquy in Congress that led to the problematic addition of the
word “now” to the IRA’s definition of “Indian” right before the legislation was enacted.34 Nonetheless, in 1944, the Department confirmed the Catawba Nation’s eligibility to organize under the IRA.35
In the 1970s, the United States brought Nonintercourse Act claims
against the State of South Carolina on the Nation’s behalf, but the
failure of Congress to enact the proposed settlement prompted the
Nation to pursue its own lawsuit against the State.36 Finally, after
years of litigation, Congress enacted the Catawba Indian Claims
Settlement Act to resolve the land claims in 1993.37
Based on this history, the Department issued a positive Carcieri finding for the Catawba pursuant to Step One of the Solicitor
Procedure. The Department found that the 1993 Settlement Act
extended the IRA to the Nation. Specifically, section 9(a) of the
Settlement Act provides that the Nation “may organize under the
Act of June 18, 1934 [IRA]” and that the Nation “shall be subject to
such Act except to the extent such sections are inconsistent with
this subchapter.”38 Additionally, section 4(b) provides that the Nation “shall be eligible for all benefits and services furnished to federally recognized Indian tribes and their members because of their
status as Indians.”39 The Department concluded the Settlement
Act “expressly extended the benefits of the IRA to the Tribe” and its
provision “make[s] clear these benefits include the ability to have
the Secretary take lands into trust for the Tribe pursuant to Section
5 of the IRA.”40
The Department further determined no other sections of the
Settlement Act restricted or curtailed the applicability of IRA Section 5 to the Nation.41 While the Settlement Act contained specific
provisions governing the creation of a federal reservation and
sovereign rights over the tribe and its former landed rights’ without objection
from the federal government”).
34. See id. at 5–6; see also M-37029, supra note 7, at 10–12 (describing the
colloquy in detail).
35. Hitchcock, supra note 31, at 6.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id. at 8.
38. Id. at 10.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id. at 15.
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acquisition in fee of other properties (all within the State of South
Carolina), the Department found these provisions not inconsistent
with the extension of IRA Section 5 to trust acquisitions outside of
South Carolina (the trust application was for a parcel in North Carolina).42 Accordingly, the Department found the Nation satisfied
Step One of the Solicitor Procedures and qualified for the IRA’s
trust land provision, at least for acquisitions outside of South Carolina.
b.

Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Texas

Another noteworthy Carcieri determination issued pursuant to
the Solicitor Procedures was for the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of
Texas.43 The Tribe originated from the Algonquin Kickapoo tribes
of the Great Lakes region and migrated to what is present-day Illinois in 1765.44 Following the Revolutionary War and the onslaught
of settlers into their territory, the Kickapoo and other nearby tribes
signed a treaty with the United States ceding approximately 3 million acres of land in exchange for annuity payments and other stipulations.45 In 1819, the Kickapoo signed another treaty with the
United States and removed to lands set aside in Missouri.46 At this
time, a band of Kickapoo moved south to Mexico near present-day
Nacogdoches, Texas and were later joined by other Kickapoo.47 Following the formation of the Republic of Texas and further migrations deeper into Mexico, in 1850 the Kickapoo and other Indians
signed a treaty with Mexico securing 70,000 acres of land for the
Indian signatories.48 Nine years later, the Kickapoo were granted
land in El Nacimiento, Coahuila (which remains part of Mexico today).49 Although based in El Nacimiento, many Kickapoo members

42. See id.
43. See generally Memorandum from Nicholas M. Ravotti, Att’y-Advisor,
Branch of Env’t & Lands, Div. of Indian Affs., to Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant
Sec’y, Indian Affs. (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/ots/pdf/Kickapoo_Traditional_Tribe_of_Texas.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E6PS-R582].
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2–3.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id.
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began to travel to the United States as migrant farmers and by the
1970s, had created a semi-permanent encampment at the border
town of Eagle Pass, Texas.50 The Kickapoo residing at this encampment became known as the Texas Band of Kickapoo Indians and in
1983 Congress enacted the Texas Band of Kickapoo Indians Reservation Act, which allowed the Tribe to organize under the IRA.51
In its Carcieri determination, the Department found the Kickapoo Tribe satisfied Solicitor Procedures Step One due to the 1983
Act’s extension of the IRA to the Tribe. Section 2 of the Act states
that “services which the United States provides to Indians because
of their status as Indians should be provided to [the Tribe’s] members.”52 Section 5 of the Act explicitly made the IRA applicable to
the Tribe, “[p]rovided, however, that [t]he Secretary is only authorized to exercise his authority under section 5 of [the IRA] with respect to lands located in Maverick County, Texas.”53 Because the
property at issue in the Tribe’s trust application was located in
Maverick County, the Department determined the Secretary has
authority to acquire land in trust for the Tribe under Section 5 of
the IRA.54
Interestingly, however, at the beginning of its determination
the Department said “[f]or the reasons explained below, we conclude that the Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.”55
Yet the Department provided no reasons or explanation whatsoever
to support its conclusion that Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction, focusing entirely on the Step One analysis. Perhaps the implication is that the Tribe lacked federal jurisdiction status due to
its strong historic ties with Mexico near the time of the IRA’s enactment in 1934. Or perhaps the conclusion was tied to the 1983 Act’s
apparent preclusion of Section 5 authority anywhere outside of
Maverick County—although it is unclear how such preclusion is relevant to historical evidence of federal jurisdiction over the Tribe in
1934. In any event, the complete dearth of analysis leaves us without clues. Nor is it clear how this conclusory finding may impact
any future trust applications by the Tribe for lands outside of
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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Maverick County, Texas given the Department’s failure to satisfy
the bare minimum of Administrative Procedure Act decision-making standards.56
c. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of
Michigan
In 2014, Interior applied M-37029 and determined the MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of Michigan
(Gun Lake Band) was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 and eligible
to have land acquired in trust.57 Notwithstanding its prior opinion,
in 2020 Interior again took up the issue of whether the Gun Lake
Band was eligible for trust land acquisition under Section 5 of the
IRA.58 Interior found that Gun Lake could not satisfy Steps One,
Two, or Three, but that the cumulative weight of the Band’s evidence satisfies Step 4. This appears to be the only time that Interior issued a determination pursuant to Step 4 of the Solicitor Procedures. Specifically, Interior cited (1) a long succession of treaties
and other courses of dealing with the United States beginning in
1795; (2) Congressional action in granting jurisdiction over Potawatomi treaty claims; (3) the Department’s establishment of the
Taggart Roll, including Potawatomi, for distributing Court of
Claims judgments; and (4) other miscellaneous actions and correspondence, including correspondence with Congress and Interior, a
federally managed school, reports from social workers to federal
agents regarding the band, and federal inquiries into the status of
the Band.59
Interior also noted its finding the Gun Lake Band met the
standard of “unambiguous previous federal acknowledgment” as
part of the Part 83 process “carries significant weight” in its determination of whether the Band was recognized and under federal
56. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 557.
57. Defendant-Intervenor’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 42–44, Patchak v. Jewell, No. 1:08-cv-01331-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 4,
2014).
58. Memorandum from Brandon Sousa, Att’y-Advisor, Branch of Env’t &
Lands, Div. of Indian Affs., to Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affs.
2
n.10
(Dec.
1,
2020),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/bia/ois/ots/pdf/Match_e_be_nash_she_wish_Band_of_Pottawatomi_Indians_of_Michigan.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE8K-NP5S].
59. Id. at 27–28.
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jurisdiction in 1934.60 Interior rejected the relevance of evidence
showing the Department tried to abandon its obligations to the
Band in the 1930s, because “only Congress can dissolve the relationship between a tribe and the federal government once established.”61 This is noteworthy because it shows Interior treated such
evidence as non-dispositive under the Procedures just as it did under M-37029. It is also an example of Interior issuing a new Carcieri determination for a tribe with an existing determination pursuant to M-37029, as further examined in the next section.
d.

Redundant Determinations

The Solicitor’s Procedures stated “[e]ligibility determinations
rendered under Sol. Op. M-37029 remain in effect and need not be
revisited.”62 However, less than three weeks after the issuance of
the Procedures and its commitment regarding prior eligibility determinations, Interior issued an eligibility determination for the
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians.63 Grand
Traverse was the subject of a prior favorable eligibility determination during the Obama administration, upheld by the Interior
Board of Indian Appeals.64 Although the Grand Traverse eligibility
determination was issued prior to M-37029, it was consistent with
its two-part framework,65 as originally set forth in the Department’s record of decision for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe.66 Interior’s
Grand Traverse decision issued under the Procedures noted it relied on the same evidence presented by the Tribe for its previous
eligibility determinations,67 raising the question of why Interior resources were spent on a redundant twenty-seven-page opinion.
Less than two months later, Interior issued another eligibility
determination for a group of tribes with an existing favorable
60. Id. at 28–29.
61. Id. at 29.
62. Solicitor Procedures, supra note 15, at 2.
63. Memorandum from Robert S. Hitchcock Att’y-Advisor, Branch of Env’t
& Lands, Div. of Indian Affs., to Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affs.
1–2 (March 27, 2020).
64. Grand Traverse Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 61 IBIA 273, 277 (2015).
65. Hitchcock, supra note 63, at 25.
66. Record of Decision, Trust Acquisition of, and Reservation Proclamation
for the 151.87-acre Cowlitz Parcel in Clark, County, Washington for the
Cowlitz Indian Tribe 117 (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Cowlitz ROD].
67. Hitchcock, supra note 63, at 26.
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determination under the Obama administration. Interior concluded all tribes in Oklahoma were eligible for trust acquisition,
noting that its conclusion was consistent with the previous analysis
relied on to find trust acquisition authority.68 Four days later, Interior issued an eligibility determination for the Osage Nation, notwithstanding the fact that it had just determined they were eligible
in its Oklahoma opinion and that the Obama administration had
determined the Osage were eligible in 2011.69
Interior issued several other eligibility determinations for
tribes for whom it had already determined it had trust acquisition
authority, even noting that prior eligibility determinations had already been issued.70
Interior’s decision to spend countless agency resources to reexamine and rewrite eligibility determinations, some of which had already been upheld on appeal, defies logic. Each new eligibility determination was dozens of pages and signed by multiple agency
attorneys. Interior wasted agency resources and tribal resources
better spent on providing services to members. Interior also opened
the door to challenges by trust land opponents to what were settled
determinations. Further, it is unclear why Interior abandoned its
commitment not to revisit prior eligibility determinations.

68. Memorandum from Chris King, Att’y-Advisor, Branch of Env’t &
Lands, Div. of Indian Affs., to Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affs.
3 n.10 (noting previous eligibility determinations), 5 (noting they are consistent) (June 11, 2020).
69. Memorandum from Chris King, Att’y-Advisor, Branch of Env’t &
Lands, Div. of Indian Affs., to Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affs.
1–2 (June 15, 2020).
70. See, e.g., Sousa, supra note 58, at 2 n.10 (noting that Interior had previously issued a favorable eligibility determination for the Band pursuant to
M-37029, but still issuing a 29 page legal opinion addressing the issue); Memorandum from John Costenbader, Att’y-Advisor, Pac. Sw. Reg’l Solic.’s Off., to
Amy Dutschke, Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian Affs. Pac. Reg’l Off. 2–3 Oct. 15,
2020); No More Slots, 56 IBIA 233, 235 (2013) (noting that Interior’s opinion
that Carcieri did not limit Interior’s authority to acquire land in trust for the
Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians); Memorandum from Tony Sullins, Reg’l
Solic., & Alex Dyste-Demet, Att’y-Advisor, Twin Cities Reg’l Solic’s Off., to
Tammie Poitra, Reg’l Dir., Midwest Region, Bureau of Indian Affs. 4–5 (Dec.
14, 2020); Village of Hobart, 57 IBIA 4, 5 (2013) (affirming the Regional Director’s determination that she had authority to acquire land in trust for the
Oneida Nation).

336 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:2
3.

M-37064: Withdrawal of Fee-to-Trust Authority for Alaska

At the end of the Obama administration, Interior concluded in
M-3704371 that the Secretary of the Interior had authority to take
Alaska lands in trust unconstrained by Carcieri, the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA),72 or the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA).73 M-37043 explained that amendments to the IRA extending certain provisions of the IRA, including
section 5, to Alaska (Alaska IRA) authorized the Secretary to acquire land in trust for Alaska Native tribes regardless of whether
they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.74 The Supreme Court
in Carcieri cited the Alaska IRA as an example of a statute in which
section 5 of the IRA applied to tribes regardless of whether they
were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.75 M-37043 followed
changes to Interior’s fee-to-trust regulations which eliminated a
regulatory ban on trust land acquisition in Alaska, as well as robust
tribal consultation on elimination of the ban and how the fee-totrust process is best applied in Alaska.76
The Trump administration made clear from the outset that it
had significant concerns about off-reservation trust acquisitions.77
On June 29, 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew M-37043,
pending further review and consultation with Indian tribes “on an

71. Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solic., Dep’t of the Interior, to
Sally Jewell, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior (Jan. 13, 2017),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/m-37043.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6XTA-HPNP] [hereinafter M-37043].
72. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h).
73. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579,
90 Stat. 2744 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787).
74. M-37043, supra note 71, at 10–11.
75. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 392 & n.6 (2009).
76. Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,888, 76895
(Dec. 23, 2014); Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 24,648,
24,649 (May 1, 2014).
77. See Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition with the Intent of
the 73rd Congress in Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act: Hearing Before
the H. Subcomm. on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affs., 115th Cong. 5
(2017) (statement of James Cason, Acting Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department
of the Interior); Doubling Down on Indian Gaming: Examining New Issues and
Opportunities for Success in the Next 30 Years: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
On Indian Affs., 115th Cong. 13 (2017) (statement of John Tahsuda III, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs).
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interim policy for off-reservation land-into-trust acquisitions within
and outside of Alaska,” because M-37043 allegedly omitted analysis of post-ANCSCA legislation on the Department’s authority to
acquire land in trust in Alaska.78
Interior then held several consultation sessions regarding land
in trust in Alaska between June 2018 and March 2019.79 Tribes
and tribal organizations overwhelmingly expressed support for
trust land acquisition in Alaska, whereas the State of Alaska argued that Interior was without authority to acquire new land in
trust in Alaska.80 On January 19, 2021, the last full day of the
Trump administration, Interior permanently withdrew its opinion
on land into trust in Alaska, concluding the Department should not
accept in trust any lands in Alaska pending resolution of “serious
concerns over the scope of the Secretary’s authority” to “accept land
in trust . . . in Alaska.”81 Interior suggested the Alaska IRA’s applicability “was limited to that time period when Alaska was a territory,” and therefore the Alaska IRA could not support trust

78. Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, Solic., Dep’t of the Interior, to
Ryan Zinke, Sec’y. Dep’t of the Interior 4 (June 29, 2018),
https://edit.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/m-37053.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QTB3-MG99].
79. Land-into-Trust in Alaska, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS., https://www.indianaffairs.gov/as-ia/raca/regulations-development-andor-under-review/landtrust-alaska [https://perma.cc/46NV-VCMP] (last visited Apr. 22, 2022).
80. See, e.g, Letter from Vivian Korthuis, Chief Exec. Officer, Ass’n of Village Council Presidents, to Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affs (Nov.
27,
2018),
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/03IRA_Assoc-of-Village-Council-Presidents_508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WR3GZVW] (expressing strong support for land into trust and M-37043); Written
Comments from Central Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/02IRA_Tlingit%26Haida-Written-Comments-on-Alaska_508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W5NV-P5BG]; Letter from Kevin G. Clarkson, Att’y Gen. of
Alaska, to Daniel H. Jorjani, Solic., Dep’t of the Interior (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.indianz.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/alaska012519.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B49E-2TAB] (urging the withdrawal of M-37043). Comments from the consultation are available at https://www.indianaffairs.gov/asia/raca/regulations-development-andor-under-review/land-trust-alaska
[https://perma.cc/37P6-AAPA].
81. Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, Solic., Dep’t of the Interior, to
David Bernhardt, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior 3 (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/m-37064-permanent-withdrawal-of-solop-m-37043-authority-to-acquire-land-into-trust-in-alaska.-01.19.2021-andmemo-executed.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY2P-KSRJ].
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acquisitions now.82 Interior also concluded “ANCSA’s comprehensive statutory scheme . . . arguably left no room for the Secretary to
create trust land outside of the settlement.”83
With the withdrawal of the Solicitor’s opinions establishing the
two-part framework and concluding that there was land into trust
authority in Alaska, the Trump administration left Interior’s feeto-trust process and authority in tatters. Alaska Native tribes had
submitted numerous fee-to-trust applications in reliance on the removal of the regulatory ban on fee-to-trust in Alaska, now left to rot
in purgatory.84 Interior and tribes had spent years developing, and
defending, fee-to-trust opinions based on the two-part framework,
but were now forced to work within a framework described by one
Federal court judge as “a joke,” and “one of the worst written documents I’ve ever read from any government agency.”85 Moreover,
given the flipflopping and the convoluted new framework, it was
unlikely that courts would give the Solicitor Procedures, or their
application, any deference.
B. The Biden Administration
As a Presidential candidate, Joe Biden campaigned in support
of restoration of tribal homelands and a clean Carcieri fix.86 These
policy perspectives carry through the Biden administration’s selection of top leadership at Interior, such as Bryan Newland as the
Assistant Secretary – Affairs,87 and the Biden administration’s
identification of “respect for Tribal sovereignty and self-governance,
commitment to fulfilling Federal trust and treaty responsibilities to

82. Id. app. at 17.
83. Id. app. at 26.
84. Written Comments from Central Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian
Tribes of Alaska, supra note 80, at 1–2.
85. Transcript of Motion Hearing, supra note 26, at 51.
86. Biden-Harris
Plan
for
Tribal
Nations,
JOEBIDEN.COM,
https://joebiden.com/tribalnations/ [https://perma.cc/QV9M-AYLC] (last visited Apr. 22, 2022).
87. See, e.g., Nomination of Bryan Todd Newland to Serve as Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 117th Cong. 1 (2021) (statement of Hon. Brian
Schatz, U.S. Senator from Hawaii).
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Tribal Nations, and regular meaningful, and robust consultation
with Tribal Nations” as priorities.88
On April 27, 2021, Interior issued M-Opinion 37070, which
withdrew M-37055, as well as M-37054, which construed the second
definition of “Indian” in the IRA.89 Interior explained that M-37055
was issued without tribal consultation, and that it was therefore
launching “meaningful and robust” consultation regarding the Department’s interpretation of the term “Indian” in the IRA.90 Interior reinstated M-37029 in the interim.91
Also on April 27, 2021, Interior issued M-Opinion 37069, which
withdrew M-37064, regarding the Department’s authority to acquire land in trust in Alaska.92 M-37069 noted that M-37064 had
ignored the Department’s rulemaking extending land into trust authority under the IRA to Alaska.93 In addition, M-37069 recommended BIA engage in tribal consultation on the Secretary’s land
into trust authority in Alaska.94
M-37070’s commitment to engage in tribal consultation on legal opinions is noteworthy. Biden’s Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, and Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, require consultation on
“Federal policies with Tribal implications.”95 That term is defined
to include “regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial
direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the
88. Joseph R. Biden, Memorandum on Tribal Consultation and Strengthening Nation-to-Nation Relationships, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 26, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/26/memorandum-on-tribal-consultation-and-strengthening-nation-to-nation-relationships/ [https://perma.cc/XX4K-2XRK].
89. Memorandum from Robert T. Anderson, Principal Deputy Solic., Dep’t
of the Interior, to Deb Haaland, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior 1 (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/m-37070.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7QA-P8AU].
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id.
92. Memorandum from Robert T. Anderson, Principal Deputy Solic., Dep’t
of the Interior, to Deb Haaland, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior 1–2 (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/m-37069.pdf [https://perma.cc/N42F-AWRX].
93. Id. at 1.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Biden, supra note 88; Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249
(Nov. 9, 2000).
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distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.”96 Legal opinions on Interior’s land into
trust authority undoubtedly have “substantial direct effects” on
tribes, and it remains to be seen whether Interior will engage in
consultation on other legal opinions.
By letter to tribal leaders dated March 28, 2022, Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs Bryan Newland announced tribal consultations on proposed changes to the Part 151 fee-to-trust regulations.97
Accompanying the consultation announcement was a proposed redlined revision of the 151 regulations.98 These proposed revisions
include, among other changes, new regulatory provisions that
would formally embody the Department’s Carcieri framework. The
framework contained in these draft proposed regulations is an interesting hybrid of the two-part test from the Obama era M-37029
and the listing of conclusive and presumptive evidence from the
Trump era Solicitor’s Procedures.99 It is an apparent attempt to
capture the judicial deference afforded M-37029 (as well as the general support of M-37029 by Indian Country) while also weaving in
the clarifying hierarchy of evidence from the Solicitor’s Procedures.
At the time of this Article, tribal consultations on the proposed regulations are ongoing. It is unclear whether Interior will adopt this
regulatory proposal, in whole or in part, or what other steps it may
take with respect to fee-to-trust, including the development of new
policies and/or legal opinions.
II. RECENT LITIGATION UPDATES

Since 2009, Carcieri has resulted in dozens of federal court and
Interior Board of Indian Appeals challenges.100 However, besides
the Mashpee litigation discussed at length below, only one other
96. Exec. Order No. 13,175, supra note 95, § 1(a).
97. Letter from Bryan Newland, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Indian Affs., to
Tribal Leaders (Mar. 28, 2022), https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/DTLL_Part-151-%26-293_Consultations_Signed_508.pdf.
98. Bureau of Indian Affs., REDLINE-25 C.F.R. Part 151 Consultation
Draft (Mar. 28, 2022), https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/25-CFR-Part-151_REDLINE-ConsultationDraft_Updated2022.03.28_508.pdf. [hereinafter 2022 Consultation
Draft]
99. Id. § 151.4.
100. Sullivan & Turner, supra note 4, at 52–81 (summarizing Carcieri-related litigation).
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federal court has addressed Carcieri since we published Enough is
Enough in early 2019. On September 5, 2019, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a federal district court decision holding
the corporate arm of the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma needed to demonstrate it satisfied a definition of
“Indian” in the IRA in light of Carcieri.101 The Tenth Circuit agreed
with the United States that the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act extended the benefits of the IRA, including the ability to have land in
trust acquired on their behalf, to “recognized tribe[s] or band[s] of
Indians residing in Oklahoma,” including UKB.102 Accordingly, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that UKB Corporation’s trust land application did not implicate Carcieri.103 The Cherokee Nation filed a
petition for rehearing en banc, which was denied.
The Cherokee Nation also filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court, which was also denied.104 In its petition, the Cherokee Nation argued that the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act’s incorporation of the IRA included the definition of “Indian” from the IRA,
and thus, UKB was still required to demonstrate that it was under
federal jurisdiction in 1934.105 The Supreme Court denied the petition.106
The Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) has only addressed
Carcieri in one decision since early 2019. In Shawano County v.
Acting Midwest Regional Director, the IBIA held that administrative collateral estoppel precluded Shawano County from relitigating whether the Stockbridge Munsee Community was under federal
jurisdiction in 1934.107 In a previous challenge to a fee-to-trust by
101. Cherokee Nation v. Bernhardt, 936 F.3d 1142, 1154–55 (10th Cir.
2019).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1155.
104. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cherokee Nation, 936 F.3d 1142 (No. 19937).
105. Id. at 14–15.
106. The Supreme Court also denied certiorari in a case filed by a citizen’s
group challenging a 2017 fee-to-trust decision for the Wilton Rancheria. Citing
Carcieri, the citizen’s group argued that the Secretary’s authority to acquire
land in trust is limited and does not extend to “Indians whose federal supervision was terminated by Congress.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, 10,
Stand Up For California! v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 994 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir.
2021) (No. 21-696). The D.C. Circuit had upheld the Department’s fee-to-trust
decision. Stand Up for California!, 994 F.3d at 630.
107. Shawano Cnty., 67 IBIA 299, 308 (2021).
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the County, the IBIA held that the Department had authority to
acquire land in trust for the Tribe.108 The IBIA therefore held that,
as a party to the prior litigation, the County could not relitigate
issues of fact or law that were “actually litigated and necessarily
decided against the party in a valid and final judgment.”109
Shawano County is significant because it establishes that the IBIA
will not reconsider a prior Carcieri determination, at least where
the same party is challenging a tribe’s “under federal jurisdiction”
status.
Neither federal courts nor the IBIA have ruled on the validity
of the Solicitor’s Procedures, other than the judge’s critical comments in Mashpee in oral argument. Nor have any courts or the
IBIA considered any challenges to the reinstatement of M-37029.
III. RECENT LEGISLATIVE UPDATES

Congress remains unable to pass a clean Carcieri fix. In the
116th Congress, members of the Senate and House introduced
clean Carcieri fixes. Congressman Cole sponsored H.R. 375 to
amend the definition of “Indian” in the IRA to replace “any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” with “any federally recognized Tribe.”110 The bill also revised the definition of “Indian tribe” to include “any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band,
nation, pueblo, village or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe.”111 H.R. 375 further
provided that its effective date was June 18, 1934, the date of the
enactment of the IRA, such that all trust acquisitions for any federally recognized Indian tribe would be reaffirmed.112 On May 15,
2019, the House overwhelmingly passed H.R. 375 on a vote of 323
to 96, making up for previous, failed attempts at fixing Carcieri.113
An opponent complained that passage of the bill would result in a
“flood of new off-reservation casinos that cause harm to States and
local communities.”114

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Shawano Cnty., 53 IBIA 62, 82 (2011).
Shawano Cnty., 67 IBIA at 307.
H.R. 375, 116th Cong. § 1(a)(1)(B) (2019).
§ 1(a)(2).
§ 1(a)(1)(A).
See generally H.R. 3697, 111th Cong. (2009).
165 CONG. REC. 3815 (2019).
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The House sent H.R. 375 to the Senate, where it died in the
Committee on Indian Affairs. Separately, Senator Tester introduced an identical fix, which also did not advance out of the Committee on Indian Affairs.115
In 2019, the House also overwhelmingly passed an act to reaffirm the Mashpee Reservation as trust land and to ratify the actions
of Interior to accept the land in trust.116 The act was referred to
the Senate, where it died. The 177th Congress has yet to consider
a Mashpee Carcieri bill.
Representative McCollum introduced a clean Carcieri fix in the
117th Congress, which overwhelming passed the House on December 1, 2021, by a vote of 302 to 127.117 H.R. 4352 replaced “any
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” with “any
federally recognized Indian Tribe”; clarified that its effective date
was June 18, 1934; and ratified past decisions challenged on the
basis of whether the tribe was under Federal jurisdiction.118 H.R.
4352 also clarified that it did not affect limitations imposed on the
Secretary’s authority by other laws.119 The House referred the bill
to the Senate, where it was referred to the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs. The Committee has not held a hearing or taken a
vote. Separately, in the Senate, Senator Tester has introduced a
clean Carcieri fix, but it has not advanced.120
At a Senate Committee on Indian Affairs hearing to consider
Native Communities’ priorities for the 117th Congress, the National Congress of American Indians reaffirmed its support for a
clean Carcieri fix.121 However, opposition remains entrenched in
the Senate.

115. S. 2808, 116th Cong. (2019).
116. H.R. 312, 116th Cong. (2019).
117. H.R. 4352, 117th Cong. (2021).
118. §§ 1(a)(1)(B), 1(b).
119. § 1(c)(1).
120. S. 1901, 117th Cong. (2021).
121. A Call to Action: Native Communities’ Priorities in Focus for the 117th
Congress: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. 117th Cong. 4 (2021)
(statement of Hon. Fawn Sharp, President, National Congress of American Indians).
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IV. THE IMPACT OF CARCIERI ON NEW ENGLAND TRIBES

The Carcieri decision impacted all tribes by increasing the burden and cost of seeking to restore ancestral lands through the feeto-trust process. Tribes located in New England face unique challenges given the long history of colonial, then state, oversight and
oppression of native people within their borders, as well as illegal
conveyances of tribal lands. The federal government often failed to
intervene and exercise its plenary authority over Indian affairs, effectively sanctioning this unlawful power structure and theft of
lands. As a result, for many New England tribes there simply are
not the same indicia of federal jurisdiction in 1934 that exist for
tribes in other regions of the United States. The following section
explores the varied situations of the New England tribes and their
options for acquiring additional lands in trust, whether through the
IRA’s definition of “Indian,” as interpreted by Carcieri, or through
subsequent extensions of the IRA via land claim settlement acts.
A. The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe
The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (Mashpee or Mashpee Tribe)
has been the subject of extensive proceedings concerning whether
it qualifies for trust land acquisitions pursuant to the IRA. As detailed below, and initially discussed in our first article, the Department has issued three fee-to-trust decisions for the Tribe. The first
two decisions, one favorable and one negative, were both litigated
in the federal courts. Following reconsideration on its second remand, the Department recently issued its third decision, concluding
that the Tribe is, in fact, eligible for trust land under the IRA.
1. Interior’s 2015 Positive Determination for Mashpee Based on
the Second Definition of “Indian.”
The Mashpee Tribe has been in southeastern Massachusetts
since time immemorial; their presence in the area was documented
by European colonizers beginning in the 1600s.122 Similar to other
New England tribes, the federal government often left the Mashpee
Indians to the authority of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
122. Record of Decision, Trust Acquisition and Reservation Proclamation
for 151 Acres in the City of Taunton, Massachusetts, and 170 Acres in the Town
of Mashpee, Massachusetts, for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe 62 (Sept. 18,
2015) [hereinafter Mashpee ROD].
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only acting intermittently towards the Tribe and its members.123
In 2007, the federal government finally recognized the Mashpee
Tribe more formally through the Part 83 acknowledgment process.124 That same year, the Tribe submitted an application for the
Department to acquire in trust lands in the Town of Mashpee for
governmental services, cultural preservation, and housing, as well
as lands in the City of Taunton for a casino-resort. Eight years
later, in 2015, the Department approved the Tribe’s application.125
In contrast to the majority of the Department’s fee-to-trust decisions, the 2015 Mashpee decision exclusively relied upon the authority stemming from the IRA’s second definition of Indian: “[A]ll
persons who were descendants of such members who were, on June
1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation.” As the language indicates, the IRA’s applicability pursuant to this definition focuses on reservation residence in 1934, as
opposed to membership in a tribe under federal jurisdiction (as contemplated by the first definition).
Since reliance on the second definition was novel, the Department undertook extensive analysis of the statutory language in its
2015 decision document. It found the language ambiguous in several respects, including whether the term “such members” incorporated by reference the entire first definition of Indian and, consequently, the Carcieri limitations.126 To resolve these ambiguities,
the Department considered the IRA’s purpose, legislative history,
implementation, and other tools of statutory construction.127 The
Department ultimately concluded that “such members” incorporates only “members of recognized Indian tribes” and not the phrase
“now under Federal jurisdiction.”128 As a result, the Department
found there was no need to evaluate whether the Mashpee Tribe
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 for purposes of applying the
second definition of Indian.129 Rather, the test was whether the
123. See id. at 117.
124. Id. at 4; Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the
Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribal Council, Inc. of Massachusetts, 72 Fed.
Reg. 8,007 (Feb. 22, 2007).
125. Mashpee ROD, supra note 122, at 136–37.
126. Id. at 80–81.
127. Id. at 81–92.
128. Id. at 93–95.
129. Id.
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Mashpee Tribe consists of “descendants of members of a recognized
Indian tribe who maintained residence within the boundaries of an
Indian reservation as of June 1, 1934.”130 After examining the historical evidence, the Department concluded that Mashpee satisfied
this definition and therefore the Department had authority under
the IRA to acquire the trust lands.131
The Department’s 2015 decision for Mashpee was successfully
challenged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on several grounds, including its statutory interpretation of
the second definition. Plaintiffs David Littlefield and other residents of the Town of Taunton opposed the Tribe’s planned development and argued that the Mashpee did not meet the second definition of “Indian” in the IRA, because, in their view, it plainly
incorporated the first definition.132 They argued that “such members” refers to the entirety of the first definition, and therefore, in
addition to meeting the second definition’s residency requirements,
Mashpee needed to show that it was under federal jurisdiction in
1934.133 The court agreed with plaintiffs, finding that the second
definition unambiguously incorporated the entire first definition,
and no deference was due to Interior’s interpretation under Chevron.134 The court also suggested that Mashpee was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934—despite the fact that Interior had never
decided the question—seemingly because the Tribe was not formally recognized until 2007.135 At Interior’s request, the court issued an order clarifying that it did not decide the jurisdictional issue, and remanded the matter to Interior for a determination on
whether the Mashpee were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.136
Following the district court’s decision, the Mashpee Tribe intervened as a defendant,137 and then appealed the district court’s

130. Id. at 101.
131. Id. at 120.
132. Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 199 F. Supp. 3d 391, 394 (D.
Mass. 2016).
133. Id. at 396.
134. Id. at 399–400.
135. Id. at 397.
136. Id. at 400.
137. See generally Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 318 F.R.D. 558
(D. Mass. 2016).
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decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.138 Interior filed a
notice of appeal, which it later dismissed.139 On February 20, 2020,
the First Circuit issued a decision upholding the District of Massachusetts’ determination that the IRA’s second definition of “Indian”
unambiguously incorporated the entire first definition.140
2. The Department’s 2018 Negative Determination under the
First Definition of “Indian.”
Following the District Court’s remand, and now with Trump
officials at the helm, the Department considered whether the Mashpee Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 for purposes of the
first definition of “Indian.” The remand proceedings included briefing on whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the Tribe by the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts could be a “surrogate” for federal
jurisdiction.141
On September 7, 2018, the Department issued its final decision
finding that the Mashpee Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction
in 1934.142 The Department, acting through Assistant Secretary of
Indian Affairs Tara Sweeney, concluded there was insufficient evidence of specific federal actions towards the Tribe before and during
1934.143 In coming to this conclusion, the Department considered
the following evidence proffered by the Mashpee Tribe:
•

an 1820 report commissioned by the Secretary of
War (who then had jurisdiction over Indian affairs)
that included the Mashpee Tribe and recommended

138. Notice of Appeal, Littlefield v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 16-2484
(1st Cir. Dec. 12, 2016).
139. See Judgment Pursuant to 1st Cir. R. 27.0(d), Littlefield, No. 16-2481
(1st Cir. May 8, 2017), 2017 WL 10238203, at *1.
140. Littlefield v. Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, 951 F.3d 30, 37 (1st
Cir. 2020) (“In our view, the word ‘such’ plainly refers to the words used in the
entire prior definition of Indian to limit the members included in the second
definition of Indian.”).
141. Letter from James E. Cason, Assoc. Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior,
to Chairman Cedric Cromwell, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe 2 (June 30, 2017),
https://legacy-assets.eenews.net/open_files/assets/2018/05/23/document_gw_06.pdf [https://perma.cc/US93-AL4E].
142. Letter from Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affs., to Chairman Cedric Cromwell, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (Sept. 7, 2018) [hereinafter
2018 Mashpee Decision].
143. Id. at 28.
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against their removal from their homelands in
Massachusetts;144

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

•

contemporary transmissions among federal officials
(including Secretary of War John Calhoun and
President Monroe) of a statistical report that
generally—but not expressly—included the
Mashpee, reiterating the recommendation against
removal of tribes in some eastern states;145

•

an 1851 report by U.S. Indian Agent Henry R.
Schoolcraft surveying the condition of tribes in the
United States and mentioning the Mashpee
tribe;146

•

an 1888 report by Alice C. Fletcher, prepared under
the auspices of the Department of the Interior’s
Commissioner of Education, that described the
Mashpee tribe’s history;147

•

a 1935 draft report on New England tribes prepared
by Gladys Tantaquidgeon for the Office of Indian
Affairs that detailed the Mashpee lands, education,
health needs, and other facets of Mashpee life;148

•

an 1890 Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs that noted the Mashpee reservation
in Massachusetts;149

•

a 1940s title report prepared for condemnation
proceedings brought by the Department of the Navy
against lands for which Mashpee tribal members
had some sort of easement to cross to gather
seaweed and marsh hay;150

Id. at 20–22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
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Carlisle Indian Boarding School records from 1905–
1918 documenting the attendance of Mashpee
children;151

•

And A 1910 federal Indian census (conducted by the
U.S. Director of the Census as opposed to the Office
of Indian Affairs) that listed Mashpee members.152

349

Despite the fact the Mashpee were included in numerous federal reports examining the Indian tribes and contemplating federal
policy, the Department rejected the sufficiency of the evidence for
showing federal jurisdiction. The Department crafted a new rule
regarding “federal reports” (whatever that classification might
mean), diminishing—or perhaps completely eliminating—the evidentiary value of a report unless it specifically resulted in direct
federal action towards a tribe.153 A federal decision of inaction, as
was the case with the United States declining to impose the removal policy on Mashpee, was not sufficient.
The Department also rejected Mashpee’s argument that certain legislation and legal principles, such as the Non-Intercourse
Acts and the United States’ assumption of the British Crown’s obligations, created federal jurisdiction over the Tribe by operation of
law.154 The Department drew parallels to its previous rejection of
Congressional plenary authority as a basis for demonstrating jurisdiction and further admonished that “the tribe cannot rely on an
inchoate jurisdictional status as the basis for being under federal
jurisdiction.”155
However, the decision could have been worse for Indian country, generally. Interior declined to find that a state’s historical

151. Id. at 27.
152. Id. at 28.
153. See, e.g., id. at 24 (“While the Fletcher report does describe the Tribe’s
historical ties to its lands, it makes no assertion as to the Federal Government’s role, if any, in establishing or maintaining such ties, and thus offers no
evidence of the exercise of Federal authority over the Tribe or its members beyond the general principle of plenary authority.”) (emphasis added); id. at 25
(“While the Tantaquidgeon report offers historical evidence of the Tribe’s longstanding historical use and continued occupation of Tribal lands, it provides
little if any demonstration of the exercise of Federal jurisdictional authority
over the Tribe.”) (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 13–15.
155. Id. at 14.
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exercise of jurisdiction over a tribe implied or amounted to the surrender of federal jurisdiction over that tribe.156 The opponents
broadly asserted that all New England tribes had been subject to
state jurisdiction—as evidenced by the peculiarities of colonial history and the power apportionment between the fledgling federal
government and the colonies-turned-states—and, further, that all
state jurisdictional tribes could not have also been under federal
jurisdiction.157 Had Interior taken the bait, this could have had
potentially massive impacts for New England tribes, or even all
tribes residing within the thirteen original colonies (now states). 158
Moreover, Interior left open the possibility that a state’s exercise of jurisdiction could be a surrogate for federal jurisdiction, as
long as there is some evidence of “any Federal authorization, confirmation or ratification of state authority, or delegation of Federal
authority to the state.”159 In this particular case, however, Interior
found no such evidence and rejected the Tribe’s argument that Massachusetts’ exercise of jurisdiction was a surrogate for federal jurisdiction.160
3.

Litigation of the Department’s 2018 Negative Decision

The Mashpee Tribe challenged the 2018 decision in federal district court in the District of Columbia161 and the group of local citizens represented by David Littlefield joined as intervenor-

156. Compare id. at 9 (summarizing plaintiffs’ arguments that federal and
state jurisdiction could not co-exist in the original 13 states) with id. at 20 (rejecting plaintiffs’ broad assertion that the 13 original states maintained independent and exclusive authority over Indian affairs, instead focusing on
whether Massachusetts’s exercise of jurisdiction over Mashpee was coupled
with federal participation or authorization).
157. Id. at 9–10 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ position). As Interior states,
“[t]hough it is somewhat unclear, the Littlefields appear to argue that the Commonwealth assumed authority over Indian affairs in the state directly from
colonial authorities and exclusive of the Federal Government.” Id. at 17.
158. See id. at 17 (“[T]he Supreme Court long ago held that the Continental
Congress assumed management over Indian affairs ‘first in the name of these
United Colonies; and afterwards, in the name of the United States.’”).
159. Id. at 20.
160. Id.
161. Complaint, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Zinke, 466 F. Supp. 3d 199
(D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:18-cv-02242).
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defendants.162 Following briefing on the merits, in March 2020, the
Department withdrew M-37029 (i.e. the two-part framework) and
implemented the new four-step Solicitor Procedures, as described
infra in Section II.a.i. Interior did not notify the court of this development.
On March 27, 2020, in an unexpected blow to the Mashpee
Tribe, the Department also directed the local BIA agency to remove
from trust the Mashpee’s reservation land in the Town of Mashpee
and City of Taunton.163 The Tribe responded by filing an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction against the Department.164 The court consolidated the
hearing on the merits with the hearing on emergency injunctive relief.165 Later, in response to independently learning about the Department’s withdrawal of M-37029, the court ordered supplemental
briefing on whether the administrative change should affect the
court’s deference to the Secretary’s application of M-37029 to the
Mashpee Tribe in its 2018 decision.166 At this time, and in a highly
unusual move, a collection of Congressional members—including
then Representative, now Secretary of the Interior, Deb Haaland
and Massachusetts Senators Elizabeth Warren and Edward J.
Markey—filed an amicus brief supporting the Tribe. The Congressional amici challenged both the Department’s attempt to remove
the Mashpee lands from trust and the 2018 determination that the
162. Minute Order Granting Motion to Intervene, Mashpee Wampanoag
Tribe, 466 F. Supp. 3d 199 (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:18-cv-02242).
163. Letter from David Bernhardt, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior, to Dir., Bureau of Indian Affs. and E. Reg’l Dir,, Bureau of Indian Affs. (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/littlefield-v-mashpee-wampanoag-indian-tribe-951-f.3d-30-1st-cir.-2020-signed-2020.03.27.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XYM3-MHVU].
164. Plaintiff Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Mashpee Wampanoag
Tribe, 466 F. Supp. 3d 199 (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:18-cv-02242).
165. Order Consolidating Hearings, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, 466 F.
Supp. 3d 199 (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:18-cv-02242).
166. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe,
466 F. Supp. 3d 199 (D.D.C. 2020) (No. 1:18-cv-02242) (“The Court frankly is
shocked that the government did not bring this change to the Court’s attention
and discuss its relevance, or lack thereof, to the pending motions for summary
judgment and preliminary injunction. The Court was left to discover this
change on its own less than one week before oral argument on the very question of whether the agency’s application of the M-Opinion was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.”).
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Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction as gross infringements
upon Congressional authority.167 They found that the Department
had “not identified any congressional delegation of powers to remove the Tribe’s land from trust” and rejected the notion that the
IRA contains implicit authority to rescind an action properly delegated.168 The Congressional members concluded:
Simply put, Congress did not authorize the Secretary
through the IRA, or any other provision of federal law, to
remove the Tribe’s land from trust. Therefore, by purporting to take Mashpee’s land out of trust, the Secretary is
brazenly invading the province of Congress and acting unlawfully.169
The Congressional amici further disputed the federal government’s claim that the recent First Circuit decision on the IRA’s second definition of “Indian”—invalidating the Department’s 2015 positive determination for the Mashpee Tribe—required the
Department to unwind the trust transfer.170 The amici highlighted
that the First Circuit decision did not actually order the Secretary
to remove the land from trust and the decision was not final as there
remained time for the Tribe to seek certiorari.171 The amici also
emphasized that in the instant litigation, the D.C. District Court
had not yet opined on the validity of the Department’s 2018 decision
concerning its authority over the Mashpee pursuant to the IRA’s
first definition of “Indian,” therefore there was still opportunity for
the trust transfer to be deemed valid.172
The Congressional amici also denounced the Department’s
2018 conclusion that the Mashpee were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.173 They argued that the administrative record contained clear and sufficient evidence of a jurisdictional relationship,
167. See generally Brief of Members of Congress as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, 466 F. Supp. 3d 199 (D.D.C. 2020)
(No. 1:18-cv-02242). The signatories also included Massachusetts representatives Bill Keating, Lori Trahan, Ayanna Pressly, Joe Kennedy III, Stephen F.
Lynch, James P. McGovern, and Katherine M. Clark.
168. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
169. Id. at 11–12.
170. Id. at 12.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 13–19.
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specifically pinpointing pieces of evidence they believed the Department overlooked or undervalued in its 2018 determination.174 The
Congressional amici concluded the “Secretary has ignored Congress’ clear recognition that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction” and, by doing so, has “usurped Congress and its well-established plenary power to define the federal relationship with
tribes.”175
Following briefing, the District Court granted the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment. The Court first considered whether
the Department’s changed approach to Carcieri impacted the level
of deference owed to the legal framework in M-37029, but seemingly
side-stepped the issue, leaving intact the Chevron deference previously applied by the D.C. Circuit.176 The Court was nonetheless
cognizant of how the standards embodied in the new Solicitor Procedure might have impacted the Department’s analysis of the Tribe
under the old M-37029 framework.177
The Court found the Department misapplied M-37029 by evaluating each piece of evidence in isolation rather than in concert,
174. See, e.g., id. at 16 (finding that the 1822 Morse Report “demonstrates
that Congress recognized it had the authority to remove the Tribe” and that it
is “unmistakable evidence that Congress considered the Tribe as remaining
under federal jurisdiction”); id. (finding the 1935 Tantaquidgeon report probative where it was funded by congressional appropriations, prepared at the behest of the BIA, and used to develop policy and address the Tribe’s educational
needs); id. at 18 (finding that the attendance of Mashpee children at the Carlisle Indian School between 1905 and 1918 was a “clear exercise of federal authority over the Tribe’s members” and relevant indicia of the Tribe’s federal
jurisdiction status); id. at 18–19 (finding the 1911 and 1912 BIA census for the
Carlisle Indian School as “another clear indication that Congress and the Executive Branch recognized the Tribe was under its jurisdiction,” and that the
federal census prepared by the U.S. Census Office which listed Mashpee members was also probative and should have been considered in concert with the
other evidence).
175. Id. at 18–19.
176. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, 466. F. Supp. 3d at 216 (citing Grand
Ronde v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). The court perhaps did
not further question the appropriate level of deference because the Tribe itself
did not challenge M-37029, only the way that it had been applied in the Tribe’s
circumstances, and the parties agreed that the withdrawal of the M-37029 and
issuance of new guidance did not affect the court’s analysis of whether M-37029
had been properly applied to the Tribe. See id. at 216–17.
177. Id. at 219 (“The Court agrees that some of the reasons that the Secretary provides in the 2018 ROD as to why the Mashpee’s evidence is insufficient
reflects some of the new standards recently issued in 2020.”).

354 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:2
failing to consider certain evidence as probative, and treating certain evidence inconsistently with the Department’s prior treatment
of such evidence in Carcieri determinations for other tribes.178 The
Court contrasted the 2018 decision’s repeated language that certain
evidence “in and of itself” was insufficient with M-37029’s acknowledgment that “a variety of actions when viewed in concert may
demonstrate that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction.”179 Regarding evidence that Mashpee children had been educated at a
BIA school, the Court rejected the 2018 decision’s conclusion that
such evidence only concerned individuals and was not indicative of
jurisdiction over the Tribe. The Court found that M-37029 “expressly allows for a federal action towards some tribal members—
here, students—to service as evidence that supports a finding that
a tribe as a whole was under federal jurisdiction” and that pursuant
to a properly applied M-37029 framework, this is “strong probative
evidence that the Mashpee was under federal jurisdiction.”180 The
Court also found the Department’s treatment of BIA school enrollment in this case inconsistent with the Department’s prior Carcieri
determination for the Cowlitz tribe, where BIA school enrollment
records were expressly relied upon in support of finding federal jurisdiction.181
The Court also rejected the Department’s dismissal of evidence
that Mashpee students were included the 1911 and 1912 census
prepared by the BIA Superintendent of the Carlisle School because
the Department’s repeated rationale—that it only concerned individuals and was not necessarily predicated on a jurisdictional relationship with the Tribe—was inconsistent with M-37029.182 The
Court also rejected the Department’s dismissal of the 1910 Indian
Population Schedule simply because it was prepared by the

178. Id. at 217–33.
179. Id. at 217–18; see also id. at 218 (“The Secretary’s incorrect application
of the M-Opinion – evaluating the evidence in isolation and failing to view the
probative evidence ‘in concert’ – taints every category of evidence that the Secretary discussed in the 2018 ROD.”).
180. Id. at 220. The Court further points to the fact that the BIA school
records for Mashpee students enumerated their tribal affiliation. Id. at 222.
181. Id. at 221.
182. Id. at 225. Moreover, as the Court pointed out, the 2018 Mashpee Decision failed to reference or consider the 1912 BIA school census entirely. Id.
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Director of the Census, as inconsistent with Departmental positive
treatment of similar evidence for other tribes.183
The Court was similarly unpersuaded by the Department’s
minimization of federal reports that listed or described the Mashpee tribe on the basis that such evidence only showed the federal
government’s awareness of the tribe, as opposed to federal action
towards the tribe.184 For example, the Court found the 1820 Morse
Report was “more than a mere ‘compilation’ of evidence; Reverend
Morse made specific recommendations in his report about how the
federal government should treat the various tribes, including the
Mashpee Tribe.”185 Furthermore, the Court found the Department
failed to properly consider whether the federal government’s subsequent re-use of the Morse Report and the information gathered
herein was probative of jurisdiction.186 Similarly, the Court rejected the Department’s rationale for dismissing the 1934 Tantaquidgeon report because it failed to show any “formal action” by
a federal official “determining any rights of the Tribe.”187 The
Court also rejected the Department’s dismissal of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs’ 1890 annual report since these annual

183. Id. at 226 (“Not only must the Secretary explain why it matters that
the 1910 Indian Population Schedule was prepared by the Director of the Census [as opposed to the Office of Indian Affairs], he must also explain why inclusion in federal census counts was treated as probative evidence that a tribe
was under federal jurisdiction in the Tunica Biloxi ROD but not for the Mashpee Tribe.”). The Court also rejected the Department’s argument, without further explanation, that census evidence is not probative unless prepared pursuant to the 1884 Appropriations Act. See id. at 226–27 (noting that in its prior
decision for the Cowlitz tribe, the Department had relied on census evidence
not prepared pursuant to the 1884 Act, even treating it as unambiguous evidence of jurisdiction).
184. Id. at 228–33.
185. Id. at 229 (quoting the 2018 Mashpee Decision). The Court also noted
that the Morse Report was analogous to a federal report and census relied upon
by the Department in finding federal jurisdiction over the Ione Band. Id. at
229–230.
186. Id. at 230–31.
187. Id. at 232 (quoting the 2018 Mashpee Decision). The Court determined
that “the M-Opinion does not require evidence that a federal official expressly
determined any rights of a tribe for he evidence to be probative of a tribe being
under federal jurisdiction.” Id.
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reports had been relied upon as probative of jurisdiction in other
Departmental decisions.188
The Court did not, however, impose a blanket rule that inclusion on any type of federal report is probative evidence. It left intact
the Department’s rejection of an 1885 report, commissioned by the
Senate, on Indian education that described the Mashpee tribe’s history.189 It is not entirely clear why the Court distinguishes the 1885
education report from the others, although it may be that the Court
viewed the other federal reports as resulting in funding decisions,
informing policy development, or looking more akin to census/statistical compilations relied upon in other Carcieri determinations.
The Court also left intact the Department’s rejection of other types
of evidence, including the 1940s title report prepared for the Department of the Navy’s condemnation proceedings that noted an
easement used by Mashpee tribal members.190 In conclusion, the
Court remanded the question of whether the Mashpee Tribe was
under federal jurisdiction to Interior, where it remains pending.191
Concurrent with its opinion on the merits of the case, the Court
issued a separate order imposing a temporary stay on the Department to prevent it from taking the Mashpee lands out of trust until
the Department had issued a new decision on remand.192 The Department had argued that the First Circuit decision concerning the
second definition of “Indian” vis à vis Mashpee amounted to a mandate requiring the Department to remove the underlying lands from
trust.193 The Court disagreed, finding: “[n]othing in the First Circuit’s opinion goes beyond the remedy that the district court already
had ordered: a remand to the agency. There is no language in the
First Circuit’s opinion that instructs the Department to

188. Id. at 233 (citing an earlier Departmental finding of jurisdiction for the
Oneida Nation of Wisconsin).
189. Id. at 233–34.
190. Id. at 234–35.
191. Id. at 206.
192. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 163. Interestingly,
in its decision on the merits the Court denied the Tribe’s request for a preliminary injunction as moot, but then appeared to determine later that same day
that the Department might act to reverse the trust acquisition and therefore
there was a need to maintain the status quo during the remand proceeding,
hence the separate opinion and order. Id. at 2.
193. Id. at 4.
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immediately remove the land from trust.”194 The Court further
found any agency action here to change the status quo while the
Department was still considering the issue on remand would result
in irreparable harm to the Tribe.195 The Court cited the Tribe’s
“loss of sovereign authority over the Tribe’s historic lands” as the
“most obvious harm” and found that the nature of such harm cannot
be “calculated in terms of money.”196 The Court further determined
there was no public interest or potential harm to the defendant
United States and the private citizen defendant-intervenors from
maintaining the lands in trust during remand that could outweigh
the Tribe’s irreparable injury.197
Finally, the Court did not squarely address arguments about
the Department’s process for removing lands from trust, and
whether it has the statutory authority to do so. Nonetheless, the
Court noted “these doubts raised by the Tribe and Members of Congress as to whether Congress has ever authorized such action certainly weigh in favor of maintaining the status quo for now” and
“[a]s always, there is a weighty interest indeed in requiring the Executive Branch of government to comply with the law.”198
4. The Department’s 2021 Positive Determination Pursuant to the
First Definition
On its second remand, now in the Biden administration, the
Department considered much of the same evidence but came to a
very different conclusion. The Department found the federal government’s jurisdiction over the Tribe began as early as 1820, when
194. Id. a 5.
195. Id. at 5–7.
196. Id. at 6 (quoting the Tribe’s briefing on a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction). The Court further determined that “[i]f the land
is taken out of trust, then the Mashpee Tribe will lose its sovereignty over the
land in its entirety. The total loss of sovereign authority, self-government, and
jurisdiction over the land is unquestionably an irreparable harm.” Id. at 6-7.
197. Id. at 7–9. The Court found that the United States’ “argument that it
needs to take the land out of trust now in order to account for the state and
local interests in Massachusetts rings hollow.” Id. at 8. The Court also rejected
defendant-intervenors’ argument that removing the land from trust would provide “assurances that the casino will not be constructed, thereby preserving
the [defendant-intervenors’] community and way of life,” given that there could
only be certainty once the Department completed a new decision on remand.
Id. at 8–9.
198. Id. at 9.
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it considered removal of the Tribe to the western territories, and
remained intact as of 1934 since Congress never terminated jurisdiction over the Tribe nor was there evidence that the Tribe’s jurisdictional status was “otherwise lost.”199
In contrast to the negative 2018 decision, the Department
found that the collection of evidence from the 1820s showing the
United States’ consideration of the Tribe in its removal policy
plainly amounted to an exercise of federal jurisdiction, despite the
fact it ultimately chose not to remove the Tribe.200 The Department
concluded “[t]he Morse report and federal officials’ subsequent reliance on it, provide probative evidence that the Federal Government
actively considered the Mashpee within its jurisdiction and subject
to the removal policy, but chose instead to affirmatively protect the
Tribe’s occupancy of its land.”201 This analysis seems to dovetail
with the decision’s inclusion of a thorough analysis of the reservation-like status of Town of Mashpee and its long historical importance to the Tribe.202 While the Department did not consider
the reservation directly within the two-part test, it found that the
Tribe’s “continuous occupation of this land is a fundamental feature
of its history and provides the backdrop for understanding the
Tribe’s relationship with the federal government and subsequent
federal exercises of jurisdiction.”203
The Department also relied heavily on the attendance of Mashpee children at the federally operated Carlisle Indian School

199. See generally Letter from Bryan Newland, Assistant Sec’y, Indian
Affs., to Brian Weeden, Chairman, Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (Dec. 22, 2021)
[hereinafter 2021 Mashpee Decision]. This decision “confirmed” the original
2015 Record of Decision to accept the Mashpee and Taunton parcels in trust
for gaming but amended the sections concerning the statutory authority (i.e.
the Carcieri analysis) and the initial reservation determination pursuant to
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
200. See id. at 12–16. In comparison, the 2018 Mashpee Decision found that
“[t]he Morse Report shows that the Federal Government did little more than
consider the Tribe, along with tribes across the United States, as potentially
subject to the exercise of the federal Indian authority, in this case for the purpose of removal and resettlement”). 2018 Mashpee Decision, supra note 142, at
21 (emphasis in original).
201. Id. at 15–16.
202. Id. at 9–12.
203. Id. at 12. The Department expressly declined to find that the Tribe’s
occupation of its reservation-like town in 1934 constitutes dispositive evidence
of federal jurisdiction. Id.at 12 n.97.
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between 1905 and 1918 to demonstrate that federal jurisdiction had
attached prior to 1934. This analysis is significant because it more
fully elaborates on the federal policy underlying the Indian boarding school era and the United States’ attempt to eviscerate tribal
community and culture by forcing separation and acculturation
onto tribal children.204 In doing so, this decision more clearly establishes the connection between federal supervision over individual Indian children and the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the
tribe as a whole. The Department also appears to have elevated the
evidentiary value of boarding school attendance records where such
attendance demonstrate comprehensive federal control over all aspects of a tribal child’s life, as well as federal efforts to hasten “the
end of tribes and tribal communities.”205
The 2021 decision also took a different approach to federal reports. The 2018 decision rejected such reports as only demonstrating federal awareness of the Tribe, as opposed to federal action toward the Tribe. The 2021 decision, however, found these same
documents to “provide probative evidence that the Federal Government was not only aware of its jurisdiction over the Tribe, but, pursuant to that authority, took affirmative actions to document the
Tribe’s living conditions, document their numbers and propose
plans for improving the Tribe’s status as part of the federal government’s implementation of federal Indian policy.”206 Similarly, the
2021 decision found that inclusion of Mashpee members on census
records helped inform federal policy and action.207 Therefore, while
inclusion of a single federal report or census may not “in and of itself” establish jurisdiction, the evidence viewed in concert, and in
the larger context of federal policymaking, is probative.
Perhaps the most important part of the 2021 decision was its
conclusion that federal jurisdiction over the Mashpee remained intact in 1934, despite the high degree of oversight from the Massachusetts state government and contemporaneous statements from
204. See id. at 16–19 (explaining how the Indian boarding school system
was designed to “further the federal Indian policy of the time by indoctrinating
children perceived as being too ‘Indian’ or too connected to tribal culture” and
referencing various scholars and sources, such as appropriations language and
agency education circulars).
205. Id. at 19.
206. Id. at 20.
207. Id. at 23–24.
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federal officials disclaiming their jurisdiction over the Tribe.208 Regarding the state jurisdictional issue, the Department reiterated
the principle that the “paramount federal authority over Indian affairs extends to all states, including the original thirteen.”209 Further, this federal authority “cannot be constrained or supplanted by
state activity or policy and federal jurisdiction is not surrendered
through acquiesce.”210 Perhaps this conclusion would differ had the
federal government never actually exercised its jurisdiction over
the Mashpee Tribe, but the Department found that the record sufficiently demonstrated the exercise of federal jurisdiction, even if
not consistent over the years.211
Moreover, the Department found that statements by federal officials in the 1930s disclaiming jurisdiction over the Mashpee tribe
were not in and of themselves dispositive of the Tribe’s jurisdictional status.212 To start, only Congress may terminate tribes—
federal officials lack this authority.213 Instead, as the 2021 decision
explains, these letters are “best characterized as reflections of
evolving federal policy, practical constraints on implementing the
IRA, and factual mistakes, rather than termination” of the Tribe’s
jurisdictional status.214 In other words, these letters were a result
of the federal practice of deferring to the original states in their
handling of Indian affairs, the financial realities of the Great Depression era, and internal agency ignorance or mistake as to its previous work and relationship with the Tribe.215 But because Congress itself had never “adopted or considered any termination
legislation regarding the Tribe and the Tribe maintained a continuous tribal existence during the 1930s,” the Department found the

208. See id. at 25–30.
209. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 30.
211. Id. at 29–30.
212. Id. at 27–29.
213. Id. at 27 (“Federal officials, moreover, lack the authority to terminate
tribal existence, whether through express action or neglect.”); id. at 29 (“Furthermore, the United States has plenary authority over tribes and their members, and only Congress can terminate such authority.”).
214. Id. at 27.
215. Id. at 27–28. For these same reasons, the Department rejected the idea
that the federal government’s failure to hold an IRA Section 18 election at the
reservation-like Town of Mashpee indicated that the Tribe’s jurisdictional status had been terminated. Id. at 26.
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weight of the evidence demonstrated that jurisdiction remained intact in 1934.216
5.

Takeaways from the Mashpee Proceedings

Several major points can be drawn from the protracted agency
decision-making process and litigation concerning the Mashpee.
First, the 2021 Mashpee Decision obviously sets helpful precedent
for other New England tribes sharing a similar history. Moreover,
this agency decision is undergirded by the analysis and findings in
the D.C. District Court decision. However, the 2021 Mashpee Decision is virtually guaranteed to be litigated and plaintiffs will almost certainly choose the District of Massachusetts as their preferred venue for filing suit. The District of Massachusetts and the
First Circuit generally have not shown themselves to be a favorable
forum to the Mashpee Tribe’s “federal jurisdiction” status or to the
Department’s interpretation of its authority pursuant to the
IRA.217
Moreover, the Trump era frolic and detour into the four-step
Solicitor Procedures may undercut the strong judicial practice of
deferring to the Department’s Carcieri determinations, although
the recent reinstatement of M-37029 may increase the likelihood of
deference. It is possible that litigation on the 2021 Mashpee Decision could give rise to a circuit split on the Department’s two-part
framework, with the First Circuit striking it down as an unreasonable interpretation of the statute, while the D.C. Circuit and Ninth
Circuit have upheld that framework.
The second important point is that it will be difficult for the
Department to reverse a trust acquisition without: 1) a congressional act clearly authorizing the Department’s action, or 2) a federal court order enjoining the Department to do so. In other words,
216. Id. at 29.
217. In addition to affirming the District Court’s overturning of the Department’s positive 2015 decision, the First Circuit has noted in unrelated litigation that it does not believe the Mashpee Tribe was under federal jurisdiction
in 1934, basing this conclusion on the fact that the Tribe did not receive its
Part 83 acknowledgement until 2007. See KG Urban Enterprises v. Patrick,
693 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Neither the Mashpee nor the Aquinnah, the two
federally recognized tribes in Massachusetts, were federally recognized in
1934, raising the serious issue of whether the Secretary has any authority,
absent Congressional action, to take lands into trust for either tribe.”) (internal
citations omitted).
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a court order invalidating the underlying decision to acquire the
land in trust, without injunctive relief, will likely not suffice. It may
also be, at least according to the Congressional members represented as amici in the Mashpee D.C. district court litigation, that
the Department cannot reverse a trust acquisition until all appeals
have been exhausted, including review or denial of certiorari at the
Supreme Court level.218
B. Narragansett Indian Tribe
As far as we are aware, the Narragansett Indian Tribe has not
attempted to obtain trust lands under section 5 of the IRA following
the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Carcieri that the Tribe was not
under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Since neither the United States
nor the Narragansett Indian Tribe actually briefed the issue,219
however, nor was there an underlying Departmental determination
on the issue, it is possible the Department could consider issuing a
comprehensive analysis of the Tribe’s jurisdictional status pursuant to the two-part framework. Such an analysis should rely heavily on the fact that Narragansett children attended BIA schools in
the early 1900s,220 as evidence of boarding school attendance is an
increasingly important demonstration of federal jurisdiction.221
The Department would nonetheless have to overcome the substantial hurdle of the Carcieri Court’s reliance on Supreme Court Rule
15.2, which allowed it to accept as true any uncontested statements
of fact or law made in the petition for a writ of certiorari.222
218. See Brief of Members of Congress as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff, supra note 167, at 13.
219. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395 (2009) (“None of the parties
or amici, including the Narragansett Tribe itself, has argued that the Tribe
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.”).
220. Carlisle Indian Industrial School (1879-1918), CARLISLE INDIAN INDUS.
SCH., https://home.epix.net/~landis/tally.html [https://perma.cc/2JRG-PMD5].
221. This is consistent with the 2021 Mashpee decision and is further underscored by now Secretary Haaland’s creation of a Federal Indian Boarding
School Initiative. See Secretary Haaland Announces Federal Indian Boarding
School Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (June 22, 2021),
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-haaland-announces-federal-indian-boarding-school-initiative [https://perma.cc/V42H-9SPN].
222. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 396 (“[T]he petition for writ of certiorari filed in
this case specifically represented that ‘[i]n 1934, the Narragansett Indian Tribe
. . . was neither federally recognized nor under the jurisdiction of the federal
government.’ Respondents’ brief in opposition declined to contest this
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Moreover, the court noted there was evidence in the record that the
Narragansetts could not show they were under federal jurisdiction
in 1934, and cited to the Final Determination of Federal Acknowledgement of the Tribe from 1983.223 In addition, Justice Souter in
dissent noted he would have supported a remand to allow Interior
and the Tribe to address the question, but his position was not accepted by the majority.
Unlike the land claims settlement acts for some other New
England tribes, discussed in more detail below, the Tribe’s settlement act did not specifically or generally extend the benefits of the
IRA to the Tribe. The Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act
was enacted by Congress in 1978 to resolve the Tribe’s Non-Intercourse Act claims to land in the City of Charleston, Rhode Island.224
The Act resulted in the transfer of 1,800 acres to a state law corporation, consisting primarily of tribal representatives, and the lands
were to remain subject to state jurisdiction.225 At the time of the
Act, the United States did not formally recognize the Tribe. Nonetheless, the Act contained a provision stating that should the Department of the Interior subsequently acknowledge the Tribe, the
settlement lands would be restricted from alienation.226 Five years
later, the Department of Interior formally acknowledged the Tribe
through the Part 83 procedures and shortly thereafter acquired the
settlement lands in trust for the Tribe.227
Unfortunately, there is no language in the Narragansett’s settlement act that supports an argument it extended the IRA to the
Tribe. Moreover, there are individuals on the First Circuit who
have already voiced their opinion that Section 5 of the IRA does not
apply to the Tribe. In the First Circuit decision prompting the Supreme Court’s review in Carcieri, then Circuit Judge—now Chief
Judge—Jeffrey R. Howard, authored a dissent to the majority’s affirmation of the Department’s authority to acquire trust land for
assertion. Under our rules, that alone is reason to accept this as fact for purposes of our decision in this case.”).
223. Id.
224. Pub. L. No. 95–395, § 2, 92 Stat. 813 (1978).
225. Id. §§ 7, 9.
226. Id. § 8(c).
227. See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384–85; Final Determination for Federal
Acknowledgement of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg.
6177 (Feb. 10, 1983).
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the Tribe under the IRA. Judge Howard disagreed, instead viewing
the settlement act as implicitly repealing or extinguishing the
Tribe’s right to acquire trust land under the IRA because such a
right would run counter to the conditions of settlement.228 Whether
others on the First Circuit would agree remains to be seen. Nonetheless, any Departmental decision to acquire trust land for the
Tribe, whether based on an extension of the IRA through the settlement act or a full “under federal jurisdiction” analysis, may be
met by a skeptical, if not hostile, appellate court.
C. Other New England Tribes
Beyond the Mashpee and Narragansett tribes, there are seven
other New England tribes: the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), the Mohegan
Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, and the Aroostook Band of Micmacs.
These tribes, with their own histories that in some ways mirror and
in some ways differ from Narragansett and Mashpee, have also
sought trust land acquisition. These tribes and their relative circumstances are described in more detail below.
1.

The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation

The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation is located in southeastern Connecticut. Like other New England tribes, the Nation’s
ancestral members struggled to maintain their traditional lands
upon contact by European colonizers and the foundation of the
United States.229 In 1976, the Tribe filed a lawsuit claiming that
in 1855, the State of Connecticut had illegally transferred 800 acres
of land out of the Tribe’s possession, in violation of the Nonintercourse Act.230 The lawsuit clouded title to several hundred acres of
land in and around the town of Ledyard and eventually prompted
the parties to settle.231 The settlement terms were embodied in an
228. Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15, 48–51 (1st Cir. 2008) (Howard,
J., dissenting).
229. Tribal History, MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION,
https://www.mptn-nsn.gov/tribalhistory.aspx [https://perma.cc/9Z2S-WN6B]
(last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
230. Id.; see also Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 86
(2nd Cir. 2000).
231. Id.

2022]

AN UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH

365

act of Congress called the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, which provided formal federal recognition of the Tribe
and mechanisms for reacquiring portions of the Tribe’s ancestral
lands.232
The Settlement Act extinguished the Tribe’s claims in exchange for the establishment of a $900,000 settlement fund to be
used for purchasing new lands for the Tribe.233 It provided that
newly acquired lands purchased with settlement funds would be
held in trust by the federal government on behalf of the Tribe so
long as such lands were located within a designated area surrounding the Tribe’s existing reservation, referred to as the settlement
lands.234 Lands outside the designated settlement lands that were
acquired with settlement funds could only be held in fee simple by
the Tribe and remained subject to State jurisdiction.235 Additionally, the Settlement Act stated “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this Act, all laws and regulations of the United States of general
application to Indians or Indian nations, tribes or bands of Indians
which are not inconsistent with any specific provision of this Act
shall be applicable to the Tribe.”236 Similarly, the Act provided
“[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Tribe and members of the Tribe shall be eligible for all Federal services and benefits furnished to federally recognized Indian tribes as of the date of
enactment of this Act.”237
The Tribe’s Settlement Act extended the IRA, including the
Section 5 provision for trust acquisitions, to the Tribe, as repeatedly
recognized by the Department.238 This conclusion is not altered by
232. Pub. L. No. 98-134, 97 Stat. 851 (1983).
233. Id. §§ 4, 5.
234. Id. § 5(b)(7); see also Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d
at 86.
235. Pub. L. No. 98-134 § 5(b)(8); Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
228 F.3d at 87.
236. Pub. L. No. 98-134 § 9(a).
237. Id. § 9(b). The Settlement Act also expressly acknowledged that “[t]he
State of Connecticut has provided special services to the members of the Western Pequot Tribe residing within its borders. The United States has provided
few, if any, special services to the Western Pequot Tribe and has denied that it
had jurisdiction over or responsibility for said Tribe.” Id. § 2.
238. See Memorandum to from Daniel H. Jorjani, Solic., Dep’t of the Interior, to Tara M. Sweeney, Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affs. 2 n.6 (Mar. 10, 2020)
(referencing the Mashantucket Pequot settlement act as an example of a later
Congressional extension of the IRA); Memorandum from Robert S. Hitchcock,
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the Settlement Act’s restrictions preventing lands located outside
of the designated settlement lands area purchased with settlement
funds to be held in trust. The Second Circuit determined those restrictions pertain only to lands acquired with settlement funds,
therefore lands purchased by the Tribe using other funds are subject to the Department’s typical fee-to-trust process under IRA section 5, regardless of their location.239
2.

The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah)

The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head, often referred to as
Aquinnah, is located on the island of Martha’s Vineyard in Massachusetts. The Tribe shares a common heritage with the Mashpee
tribe, as both descend from the Wampanoag people and both have
a long history of subjection to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.240 Although the Aquinnah have maintained their tribal community in Martha’s Vineyard post-European contact, the Tribe’s
landholdings were nonetheless reduced and in the 1970s the Tribe
filed a Nonintercourse Act lawsuit claiming the illegal dispossession of its lands in the Town of Gay Head.241 The lawsuit resulted
in a settlement amongst the parties that was formalized in

Att’y-Advisor, Branch of Env’t & Lands, Div. of Indian Affs., to Bruce Maytubby, Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian Affs. E. Region 10 nn.85–86 (Mar. 10, 2020)
(citing a Departmental trust acquisition made for the Mashantucket Pequot in
2017 that found that the “IRA applied to [the] Tribe as a law of general application under the [Settlement] Act”).
239. Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d at 88 (“Whether or
not [lands purchased with non-settlement funds] are within settlement land
boundaries, the Settlement Act does not apply. The Tribe may apply to the
Secretary to take them into trust under the 1934 IRA, and the Secretary’s decision will be governed by the considerations outlined in the relevant regulations. Nothing in § (b)(7) supplants the Secretary’s power under the IRA to take
into trust lands acquired without the use of settlement funds.”).
240. Wampanoag History, WAMPANOAG TRIBE OF GAY HEAD AQUINNAH,
https://wampanoagtribe-nsn.gov/wampanoag-history [https://perma.cc/5B7ZX4JW] (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
241. See Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-95, § 2, 101 Stat. 704 (1987); see also Massachusetts v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), 853 F.3d 618, 621–
22 (1st Cir. 2017) (describing the background of the Settlement Act in the context of determining whether the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act applies to
Aquinnah settlement lands).
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Congress’ enactment of the Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay
Head, Inc., Indian Claims Settlement Act in 1987.242
The 1987 Settlement Act confirmed the Tribe’s existence as an
Indian tribe with a government-to-government relationship with
the United States and set forth several mechanisms for reacquiring
portions of the Tribe’s ancestral lands.243 It extinguished the
Tribe’s land claims in exchange for the creation of a multi-million
dollar settlement fund to purchase lands for the Tribe, in addition
to lands donated by the Town of Gay Head.244 The settlement lands
were to be held by the United States in trust for the Tribe, although
still subject to state and local jurisdiction, in addition to limited
tribal jurisdiction.245 The Settlement Act resulted in the conveyance of approximately 485 acres of trust land to the Tribe.246
Unlike the settlement acts for certain other New England
tribes, Aquinnah’s Settlement Act did not contain language expressly or implicitly extending the IRA to the Tribe. The closest
provision was in Section 12, which provided “[f]or the purpose of
eligibility for Federal services made available to members of federally recognized Indian tribes, because of their status as Indians,
members of this tribe residing on Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts, shall be deemed to be living on or near an Indian reservation.”247 This, unfortunately, falls short of an extension to the Tribe
of “all laws and regulations of the United States of general application to Indians or Indian nations,” much less an express extension
of the IRA.
Accordingly, it appears the only way the Aquinnah could acquire additional trust lands beyond those provided in its settlement
act is if it satisfies the IRA’s definition of “Indian” by showing that
it was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Aquinnah’s situation is
significantly boosted by the 2021 positive Departmental decision for

242. Pub. L. No. 100-95, 101 Stat. 704.
243. Id. §§ 2, 6. The Aquinnah Tribe had already been federally acknowledged by the Department under the Part 83 process earlier that same year.
See Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Wampanoag
Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., 52 Fed. Reg. 4,193 (Feb. 10, 1987).
244. Id. §§ 3–6.
245. Id. §§ 6, 9.
246. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), 853 F.3d at 622.
247. Pub. L. No. 100-95 § 12.
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Mashpee.248 However, the First Circuit has already noted its assumption that the Aquinnah was not under federal jurisdiction in
1934.249 Yet this assumption was in the context of litigation
brought by a gaming developer concerning the validity of Massachusetts’ gaming license tribal preference and neither the Tribe nor
the Department were a party.250 Moreover, the Court’s statement
was based on the faulty assumption that the Tribe’s formal federal
acknowledgement in 1987, pursuant to Part 83, somehow precludes
a finding of federal jurisdiction over the Tribe in 1934.251 This runs
counter to the Department’s Two-Part Framework and relevant
federal caselaw and should not carry any weight in a Departmental
Carcieri determination for the Tribe.252
In any event, Aquinnah Chairwoman Andrews-Maltais has implored Congress to move forward with a clean Carcieri fix, stating
such legislation would “correct the wrongs, and injustice that has
been imposed upon our Aquinnah Wampanoag People and all Indian People since the disastrous Supreme Court decision in the Carcieri v. Salazar case in 2009.”253
3.

Mohegan (Connecticut)

In the 1970s, the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut filed
suit against the State of Connecticut in Federal district court seeking possession of 2,500 acres of land they alleged were conveyed in

248. The Aquinnah Tribe even participated in the Mashpee remand proceedings resulting in the negative 2018 Departmental decision for the Mashpee
Tribe. See Mashpee 2018 Mashpee Decision, supra note 142, at 5.
249. KG Urban Enterprises v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1, 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2012)
(“Neither the Mashpee nor the Aquinnah, the two federally recognized tribes
in Massachusetts, were federally recognized in 1934, raising the serious issue
of whether the Secretary has any authority, absent Congressional action, to
take lands into trust for either tribe.”) (internal citations omitted).
250. See generally id. at 4.
251. Id. at 11 n.8 (citing the Aquinnah and Mashpee tribes’ respective
acknowledgement determinations).
252. The same point holds true for the Mashpee tribe, who were also subject
to this erroneous conclusion by the First Circuit.
253. Press Release, Cheryl Andrews-Maltais, Chairwoman, Wampanoag
Tribe of Gay Head, Senate Bill 2808, https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chair%20II%20Senator%20Warren%20Statement%20S%202808%20
Cacieri%20Fix.pdf [https://perma.cc/C666-AKDT] (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
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violation of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act.254 The State of Connecticut, the Town of Montville, and the Mohegan Tribe entered
into a settlement agreement to resolve the land claims, and resolve
jurisdictional and gaming issues.255 In 1994, to implement the settlement, Congress enacted the Mohegan Nation of Connecticut
Land Claims Settlement Act of 1994. The Mohegan Act provided
mandatory trust acquisition authority for lands identified in the
Act, to be the Tribe’s initial Indian reservation.256 Nothing in the
Act precluded acquisitions pursuant to other authority, including
section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act. Unlike the Mashantucket Pequot Settlement Act, nothing in the Mohegan Act extends
section 5 to the Mohegan. Therefore, a determination of whether
the Tribe meets one of the definitions of “Indian” in the IRA would
be required to support an acquisition under section 5 of the IRA.
4. The Maine Tribes (Penobscot Nation, Passamaquoddy Tribe,
Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, Aroostook Band of Micmacs)
In the 1970s, the United States filed suit against the State of
Maine on behalf of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and Penobscot Nation
alleging that numerous transactions in which the tribes ceded their
land to Massachusetts and Maine violated the Indian Nonintercourse Act, and were therefore void.257 At issue were over twelve
and a half million acres of Maine land, nearly two thirds of
Maine.258
To resolve the land claims, in 1980, the United States, Maine,
the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and the Houlton
Band of Maliseet Indians, entered into a settlement, codified by
Congress through the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act
(MICSA), Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (1980). MICSA ratified
the Maine Implementing Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 30, §§ 6201–

254. See generally Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.
1980).
255. Pub. L. No. 103-377, 108 Stat. 3501, § 2(a) (1994).
256. Id. § 5(a).
257. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Norton, 528 F.2d 370,
373 (1st Cir. 1975).
258. Granville Ganter, Sovereign Municipalities? Twenty Years after the
Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, in ENDURING LEGACIES, NATIVE
AMERICAN TREATIES AND CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES, at 29 (Bruce E. Johansen, ed., 2004).
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14, the state statute addressing the relationship between the State
and the tribes.259 MICSA extinguished the land claims, established
a $27 million dollar settlement fund to be held in trust for the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation, and a $54.5 million
dollar land acquisition fund.260 The land acquisition fund supported, inter alia, the acquisition of up to 150,000 acres of land each
to be held in trust for the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot
Nation.261
MICSA also barred land acquisitions for tribes or Indians in
Maine pursuant to other statutory authority, providing “[e]xcept for
the provisions of this subchapter, the United States shall have no
other authority to acquire lands of natural resources in trust for the
benefit of Indians or Indian nations, or tribes, or bands of Indians
in the State of Maine.”262 MICSA also limited the applicability of
Federal Indian law in Maine, providing:
[N]o law or regulation of the United States (1) which accords or relates to a special status or right of or to any Indian, Indian nation, tribe or band of Indians, Indian lands,
Indian reservations, Indian country, Indian territory or
land held in trust for Indians, and also (2) which affects or
preempts the civil criminal, or regulatory jurisdiction of the
State of Maine, including, without limitation, laws of the
State relating to land use or environmental matters, shall
apply within the State.263
259. 94 Stat. 1785, §§ 2(b)(3), 6(b)(1) (1980). MIA generally treats the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation as municipalities under State
law. 30 M.R.S. § 6206(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation, within their respective Indian
territories, shall have, exercise and enjoy all the rights, privileges, powers and
immunities, including, but without limitation, the power to enact ordinances
and collect taxes, and shall be subject to all the duties, obligations, liabilities
and limitations of a municipality of and subject to the laws of the State, provided, however, that internal tribal matters, including membership in the respective tribe or nation, the right to reside within the respective Indian territories, tribal organization, tribal government, tribal elections and the use or
disposition of settlement fund income shall not be subject to regulation by the
State.”).
260. 94 Stat. 1785 §§ 4, 5.
261. Id. § 5(c).
262. Id. § 5(e).
263. Id. § 6(h). Another section, further limits the applicability of Federal
law, providing “The provisions of any Federal law enacted after October 10,
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Subsequently, a separate settlement act, afforded the Aroostook
Band of Micmacs “the same settlement provided to the Houlton
Band” in MICSA (collectively, the “Maine Settlement Acts”).264 The
Aroostook Band Act provided the tribe with a $900,000 land acquisition fund to acquire land in trust, and provided “[f]or the purposes
of application of Federal law, the Band and its land shall have the
same status as other tribes and their lands” under MICSA.265
In dicta, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held MICSA
“decisively supplants the Secretary’s authority to take land into
trust under the 1934 IRA beyond that expressly contemplated by
the Maine Settlement Act.”266 The court distinguished MICSA
from the Connecticut Indian Claims Settlement Act, which the
court reasoned did not preclude trust land acquisition under section
5 of the IRA.267 In its opposition to a petition for certiorari filed by
the State of Connecticut, the United States agreed with the Second
Circuit’s interpretation of MICSA, asserting that MICSA “contain[s] an express prohibition on the exercise of the Secretary’s general Section 5 authority to take non-settlement lands into trust for
the Indian Tribes covered by that Act.”268
Because MISCA contains its own land acquisition provisions,
and explicitly bars the Secretary to acquire lands in trust pursuant
to other statutory authorities, Carcieri is inapplicable in Maine.
However, there is renewed interest in Maine in revisiting MIA. The
Task Force on Changes to the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Implementing Act established by the State Legislature recently recommended that MIA be amended to permit Maine tribes to acquire

1980, for the benefit of Indians, Indian nations, or tribes or bands of Indians,
which would affect or preempt the application of the laws of the State of Maine,
including application of the laws of the State to lands owned by or held in trust
for Indians, or Indian nations, tribes, or bands of Indians, as provided in this
subchapter and the Maine Implementing Act, shall not apply within the State
of Maine, unless such provision of such subsequently enacted Federal law is
specifically made applicable within the State of Maine.” Id. § 16(b).
264. Pub. L. 102-171, 105 Stat. 1143, § 2(a)(5) (1991).
265. Id. §§ 5, 6(b).
266. Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2000).
267. Id.
268. On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Brief of the United States in Opposition, Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 00-1032 (2d Cir. 2000).
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trust land pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act in a manner
equivalent to that enjoyed by other tribes.269
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPINIONS

As we argued in Enough is Enough, the only way to address
Carcieri once and for all is for Congress to enact a clean Carcieri
fix. Until that point, Carcieri issues will continue to consume limited tribal and agency resources, and slow down and in some cases
prohibit altogether the restoration of tribal homelands.
As noted above, a clean Carcieri fix passed Congress in 2019,
and then again in 2021. However, both times it was referred to the
Senate, which took no action. The Senators from Rhode Island have
consistently opposed a clean Carcieri fix since Carcieri was decided
and have also opposed Congressional efforts to reaffirm the status
of Mashpee trust land.270 It seems unlikely they will allow a clean
Carcieri fix to move forward in the Senate.
Assuming Congress fails to enact a clean Carcieri fix, the next
best option is for Interior to enact a regulatory fix memorializing
the two-part framework set forth in M-37029. An M-Opinion, such
as M-37029, formally institutionalizes Interior’s legal interpretations “on all matters within the jurisdiction of the Department,
which shall be binding, when signed, on all other Departmental offices and officials and which may be overruled or modified only by
the Solicitor, the Deputy Secretary, or the Secretary.”271 An MOpinion is not a formal adjudication and does not go through public
notice and comment.
Federal courts have held that M-Opinions are not entitled to
Chevron272 deference, and are at most entitled to the lesser

269. ME. OFF. OF POL’Y & LEGAL ANALYSIS, TASK FORCE ON CHANGES TO THE
MAINE INDIAN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT IMPLEMENTING ACT 56–57 (Jan. 2020).
270. See, e.g, ‘Carcieri Fix’ Uncertain, GLOB. GAMING BUS. MAG. (Aug. 2,
2010), https://ggbmagazine.com/article/carcieri-fix-uncertain [https://perma.
cc/7W6C-KYDP]; Sam Houghton, Tribal Senate Bill in Waiting, ENTERPRISE
(Feb. 1, 2019) https://www.capenews.net/mashpee/news/tribal-senate-bill-inwaiting/article_100b3b4b-f898-54af-a1ff-fb392aa141b5.html
[https://perma.cc/E2PP-ZU8P].
271. 209 Department of the Interior D.M. 3.2(11) (2020).
272. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
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Skidmore273 deference.274 Under Chevron, a court will defer to an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute Congress charged
it to administer if it is based on a “permissible construction of the
statute.”275 Under Skidmore, an agency interpretation is “entitled
to respect,” but only to the extent that the interpretation has the
“power to persuade.”276 Courts will consider “the agency’s expertise, the care it took in reaching its conclusions, the formality with
which it promulgates its interpretations, the consistency of its
views over time, and the ultimate persuasiveness of its arguments.”277
However, courts have applied Chevron deference to Interior’s
two-part framework where applied in a fee-to-trust determination
for a particular tribe. In upholding the two-part framework, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied Chevron to Interior’s interpretation of “recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” and concluded it was “bound to defer to
[Interior’s] reasonable interpretation of the statute it is charged to
administer.”278 A federal district court in New York likewise applied Chevron to the two-part framework, in rejecting a challenge
to a fee-to-trust determination for the Oneida Nation of New
York.279 In ruling on a challenge to a fee-to-trust application for
the Ione Band, the Ninth Circuit declined to rule on whether
273. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
274. McMaster v. United States, 731 F.3d 881, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that an M-Opinion on the patenting of mining claims was only entitled
to Skidmore, and not Chevron deference); Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 833-34 (10th Cir. 1997) (declining to afford Chevron
deference to an M-Opinion in the absence of a rulemaking process or an adjudication, but concluding that the M-Opinion could, but did not in this case,
warrant deference); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
2019 WL 2635587, at *14 (S.D. Cal 2019) (declining to afford an M-Opinion
Chevron deference, and concluding that it was not persuasive and would not
be afforded “much deference”); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 478 F.Supp.3d 469, 478-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (declining to even afford
an M-Opinion Skidmore deference because the opinion was unpersuasive).
275. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
276. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
277. Cmty. Health Ctr. V. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002)
(citing United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 228, 234-35 (2001)).
278. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Oregon v. Jewell, 830
F.3d 552, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
279. Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Jewell, No. 08-660, 2015 WL 1400384, at
*7 (N.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d 673 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2016).
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Chevron deference applied because “we reach the same conclusion
as the agency even without it.”280
Given Interior’s recent flipflopping on the meaning of “recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction,” however, it is
possible a court may determine not to afford interpretations articulated through M-opinions any deference.281 In the Mashpee case,
for example, the court ordered supplemental briefing on the level of
deference owed to Interior given its unexpected change from the
two-part framework to the Solicitor Procedures, but the court did
not go as far as to eliminate deference in its final decision.282 Accordingly, to ensure its interpretation is entitled to deference, we
urge Interior to institutionalize it through notice and comment
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).283 A
reviewing court “must give effect to an agency’s regulation containing a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”284 Published regulations are subject to the rigors of the APA, including
notice and comment procedures, and are more likely to receive
Chevron deference than informal adjudications.285
Moreover, institutionalizing the two-part framework through
regulation would make it more difficult for the next administration
to reverse it. An M-Opinion does not require public notice or comment and can be overruled by the next Solicitor. Rulemakings that
have a substantial impact on tribes require tribal consultation pursuant to Executive Order 13175, as well as robust notice and comment procedures under the APA.286 Following tribal consultation,
280. Cnty. of Amador v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 872 F.3d 1012, 1025 (9th Cir.
2017).
281. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 478 F. Supp.
3d at 478 (noting that the fact that an M-Opinion was “a recent and sudden
departure from long-held agency positions backed by over forty years of consistent enforcement practices” weighed against affording it any deference);
282. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Bernhardt, 466 F. Supp. 3d 199, 209
(D.D.C. 2020); id. at 216 (citing Grand Ronde v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, 564–65
(D.C. Cir. 2016)).
283. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559.
284. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586-87 (2000).
285. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); Christensen, 529
U.S. at 587. See also Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49
(2004) (“formal adjudications and interpretations promulgated by an agency
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking are generally accorded Chevron
deference.”).
286. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
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Interior would publish a proposed rule in the Federal Register and
incorporate any comments into a Final Rule published in the Federal Register.
Interior’s fee-to-trust process is codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 151.
Interior has recently proposed draft regulations to clarify that a
tribe is eligible to have land acquired in trust on its behalf when it
is Federally recognized at the time of its application and (1) there
is specific statutory authority authorizing Interior to acquire land
in trust on behalf of the Tribe, (2) the tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934, as determined by the existence of conclusive or presumptive evidence identified in the draft regulations or, in the absence of such evidence, application of the two-part framework set
forth in M-37029.287 We strongly support the memorialization of
the two-part framework in regulation. We recommend that, in the
event Interior proceeds with finalizing the consultation draft, that
the preamble to the regulation should include the historical analysis set forth in M-37029; whereas the regulatory text would set forth
the two-part test. The preamble should also explain why each type
of evidence is relevant, noting relevant court cases. Evidence particularly relevant to New England tribes could be noted, such as
enrollment of children at boarding schools and inclusion of tribes in
federal reports developed to inform Indian affairs policy and actions. The removal of tribal children to send them to boarding
school is an extraordinary assertion of federal power over the tribe
that weighs heavily in favor of a determination that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction.
Along with formalizing the two-part framework in notice-andcomment rulemaking, the Department should shift the evidentiary
burden for Carcieri determinations. This is not reflected in the current consultation draft. Currently, the onus is on tribes to submit
all relevant historical documents and accompanying legal analysis
to prove its jurisdictional status. The Department then considers
the submitted materials and issues a determination. This process
is antithetical to the Department’s trust responsibility towards
287. 2022 Consultation Draft § 151.4. Although not enumerated in the 2022
Consultation Draft, examples of tribe specific legislation include 49 Stat. 1967,
§ 1 (1936) (Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act); 25 U.S.C. § 5119 (Alaska IRA); Pub.
L. 100-89, 101 Stat. 666 (1987) (Ysleta del Sur Pueblo); Pub. L. 100-139, 101
Stat. 823 (1987) (Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians); Pub. L. 92470, 86 Stat. 783 (1972) (Tonto Apache Tribe).
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tribes, which should include, at a minimum, shouldering the responsibility for amassing the historical record for a Carcieri determination. Second, the records most relevant to the inquiry are federal records and, as such, are housed in federal archives and
maintained by federal employees. There is a certain irony to requiring tribes (or their historians) to travel to federal archives to
pull federal records, which are then submitted back to the federal
government via federal officials at the Department. At the very
least, if the evidentiary burden is to remain with tribes, the Department should earmark funds to be distributed to tribes that would
cover the significant cost of hiring historians and lawyers to compile
their Carcieri materials.
Through its consultation draft, Interior has also attempted to
implement other changes to streamline its fee-to-trust process as
well. Tribes have complained the process is overly burdensome, resource intensive, and takes too long.288 Interior often takes years
to process fee-to-trust applications. Interior has attempted to address this by requiring BIA to issue a decision on a fee-to-trust request within 120 days after issuance of a notice of a complete acquisition package. A complete acquisition package includes, inter alia,
completion of environmental review and receipt of comments from
state and local governments. Interior has also attempted to improve the process by establishing a presumption that acquisitions
within reservation boundaries will be approved, and establishing
different processes for within reservation boundaries, contiguous,
off-reservation, and initial acquisitions.
Although an improvement, in our view, the proposed changes
to the regulations do not go far enough. As noted above, Interior
needs to do more to address the significant burden placed on tribes
by having to prepare Carcieri analyses. In addition, we offer the
following suggestions to further improve the process:
1. Imposing timelines on BIA to (a) notify state and
local governments having regulatory jurisdiction
over the land to be acquired upon receipt of an

288. See, e.g Comparing 21st Century Trust Land Acquisition with the Intent of the 73rd Congress in Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act, supra
note 77, at 14–15 (statement of Hon. Kirk Francis, President, United S. & E.
Tribes).
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application; and (b) notify applicants that an
application is incomplete.
2. Establishing a process to appeal from BIA inaction
on a fee-to-trust application that mirrors that of the
process established in the leasing regulations at 25
C.F.R. 162. The leasing regulatory process seeks to
hold BIA officials accountable by permitting
appeals to their immediate supervisors.
3. Deleting the requirements in draft section 151.3(b),
and reiterated in subsection (b) in 151.9–151.12,
assuming that they are intended to serve as a proxy
for the existing “need” requirement. Acquisition of
land in trust is always necessary to facilitate tribal
self-determination, and land need not only be
acquired on or adjacent to reservations. Rather, a
tribe should be required to simply state the purpose
of the acquisition.
4. Clarifying the National Environmental Policy Act
process, including what level of NEPA review is
required for different types of acquisitions and who
prepares the relevant documents. In addition,
NEPA compliance is often the most time-consuming
part of the trust acquisition process, and therefore
requiring BIA to issue a decision within 120 days
after the NEPA process is concluded may not in fact
do much to expedite the process.
5. Considering the practical reality that four different
tracks for fee-to-trust applications, depending on
where the land is located in relation to a tribe’s
existing land base, may be very difficult to
administer. Such a system is likely to create
distractions and confusion both within the BIA and
externally.
6. Deleting the requirement that Interior consider
whether BIA is equipped to discharge the
additional responsibilities resulting from trust
acquisition. It is unclear what this even means, and
if trust acquisition is otherwise necessary to restore
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tribal homelands or for other important purposes,
the burden should be on BIA to resolve this issue.
7. Establishing a separate section for mandatory
acquisitions.
CONCLUSION

The Carcieri decision continues to cast a pall throughout Indian country. It will take political courage and quite frankly, a
more meaningful sense of the trust responsibility, for Congress to
carry through a true legislative fix. In the meantime, we see indicia
of hope in the current administration and in the hard work and battles already won by tribal nations.

